UNDP's COMMUNITY RESILIENCE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

FINAL EVALUATION REPORT

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Prepared by:
Dominique Lallement
Kirsty Wright

Research Team
Dr. Nader Said, Reem Ziad, Zuhdi Hashweh, Joyce Kashou, Nicolas Hyman, Samer Said

PREFACE

The members of the AWRAD team, who undertook the Mid-Term Evaluation of the Community Resilience Development Program (CRDP), wish to express their utmost gratitude to the Ministry of Planning and Development (MOPAD) and to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) for the opportunity to undertake this challenging assignment. They are grateful in particular to Dana Eriekat of MOPAD, Abdullah Q. Lahlouh of MOA, Muhye el Din Al Ardah of MOLG, and Inad Shurkhi of MOJA; to Sufian Mushasha and Nader Ata of UNDP, to Marwan Durzi, head of the CRDP-Project Management Unit and his colleagues; to Maher Daoudi, Peter Lundberg, and Johan Schaar of the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), and to Reham Kharoubi of the Austria Development Agency.

The Team also thanks wholeheartedly all those who so generously gave their time for individual interviews, focus groups, and field visits. They provided the team with insights as to their experience and thoughts to make the CRDP an innovative and successful program. Finally, the team expresses its deepest gratitude to all the project implementers who strive to improve the lives of Palestinians of Area C and East Jerusalem, and to all the project beneficiaries who so generously shared with the evaluation team their realities of living under occupation, their efforts towards achieving sustainable, productive, and better human living conditions, and their hopes for a peaceful future on their land for themselves and the next generations.

The main authors of the report are Dominique Lallement and Kirsty Wright under the guidance of Dr. Nader Said, AWRAD's founder and president. The authors are thankful for the precious assistance received from AWRAD's staff, in particular Reem Zaid-Ghattas, Joyce Kashou, Zuhdi Hashweh, Samer Said, and Nicolas Hyman.

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List of Acronyms

ACTED	Agency for Technical and Development Cooperation
ADA	Austrian Development Agency
APR	Annual Program Review
CBO	Community Based Organization
COGAT	Coordinator of [Israeli] Government Activities in the Territories
CRDP	Community Resilience Development Program
CSNGS	Cross Sectoral National Gender Strategy
EJ	East Jerusalem
EU	European Commission
EU HOMS	European Union Heads of Mission
EWASH	Emergency Water and Sanitation and Hygiene
FAIR	Facilitating Access to Infrastructure Resilience in Area C and East Jerusalem Program
ICA	Israeli Civil Administration
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organization
JG	Jerusalem Governorate
LGU	Local Government Unit
LNGO	Local Non-Governmental Organization
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MOA	Ministry of Agriculture
MOJA	Ministry of Jerusalem Affairs
MOLG	Ministry of Local Government
MOPAD	Ministry of Planning and Development
OM	Operational Manual
PA	Palestinian Authority
PCBS	Palestinian Central Bureau for Statistics
PD	Program Document
PHG	Palestine Hydrology Group
PMU	Project Management Unit
PNDP	Palestinian National Development Plan
RB	Review Board
RRF	Resources and Results Framework
SB	Steering Board
SHS	Solar Home System
SIDA	Swedish International Development Agency
SMDP	Strategic Multi-sectoral Development Plan
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNISDR	United Nations Research Institute for Social Development
UN OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency
VNDP	Village and Neighborhood Program
WFP	World Food Program
WHO	World Health Organization
YWCA	Young Women's Christian Association

CRDP Evaluation: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1.   Program Background and Description.
The Community Resilience Development Program (CRDP) is the result of a three-year process activated by the Government of Sweden through the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) and the Palestinian Authority in 2009; the program has been implemented by UNDP and financed by Sweden and other donors. Sweden questioned why the PA had neglected to include Area C and East Jerusalem in its program and budgets since the signature of the Oslo Accords of 1993 and 1995, and why the donors had only earmarked their humanitarian aid, thereby supporting Israel's de facto annexation of these areas. The CRDP has to be understood in the context of political and living conditions in Area C and East Jerusalem, where Israeli occupation pursues a steady strategy of settlement expansion, progressive annexation, assimilation, and harassment of Palestinians in their daily lives through limitations on their mobility and access to land and other natural resources, and other constraints on housing, social services, and economic activities. While the Israeli occupation has a well-defined and steady strategy and has allocated substantial financial and military/police resources in these areas, the PA and the donors has been divided and neglected (with a few exceptions) to invest in the development of Area C and EJ for 20 years prior to the development of the CRDP.

The CRDP was designed, de facto, as a three-year pilot program (2012-2015). Its main goal " to empower local stakeholders in Area C and East Jerusalem, through the most appropriate partners (LNGOs, INGOs), to act with resilience to respond to threats that affect their sustenance on the land" was translated into three specific objectives:
  i)   Prevent the erosion of living conditions of Palestinians in Area C and East Jerusalem that undermines their development capital;
  ii) Protect Palestinian land and property in Area C and East Jerusalem; and
  iii) Mitigate and ideally reverse the migration flow from Area C and East Jerusalem by enhancing human security and the livelihood of Palestinians.
Four main outputs were identified to implement the program:
  (i)   Public and social infrastructure in Area C and EJRM;
  (ii) Access to and protection of natural resources;
  (iii) Economic opportunities through support to livelihoods in Area C and EJRM; and,
  (iv) Rights of Palestinian citizens in Area C and EJRM through legal protection, advocacy, and community participation and mobilization.

MOPAD and UNDP were selected to lead implementation respectively for the PA and donors, and were to co-chair the Steering Board (in charge of policy) and the Review Board (in charge of project approvals and program oversight); a PMU was set up under the UNDP/PAPP, which was to provide technical support; civil society organizations, and lately LGUs, selected through a competitive pre-qualification and call for proposals process are the implementing partners. Total financing mobilized amounts to US$16.8 million, of which US$ 13.7 million, from Sweden, US$0.5 million from the UK, US$ 2.5 million from Austria and US$ 0.1 from UNDP. Norway joined the program after the completion of the mid-term evaluation.
Forty-nine projects have been selected for implementation through calls for proposals, involving 48

implementation partners. Seventeen projects have been completed, and 19 are just starting. US$6,117,490 has been disbursed (including 6.3% for UNDP administration and services, and 2.8 % for the PMU Costs); another US$ 5,668,269 million have been committed, which leaves US$ 4,606,398 million unallocated (net of future PMU and UNDP administrative expenses, and not including the new Norwegian contribution). Projects funds have been about equally distributed between Area C and East Jerusalem, but the distribution across outputs is uneven, with over 51% of the funds going to infrastructure, 27% to natural resources, and 11% each to livelihoods and rights.

2. Purpose and Methodology of the Midterm Evaluation

The Midterm Evaluation was commissioned per the provisions of the Program Document (PD). Its purpose is to take stock of the CRDP achievements to-date and to formulate recommendations for the completion of the current phase of the program, and its continuation after 2015. The evaluation took place over a two months period, from September 1, 2014 to October 29, 2014when the draft report was submitted to CRDP management.

The Evaluation's methodology included: a substantial review of the literature and documentation on the CRDP and other relevant programs; the development of an analytical framework; 20 individual interviews; 3 focus groups; and 7 project field visits. The selection of field visits was based on the following criteria: geographical and thematic/output balance; exposure to the full range of civil society organizations; availability of project managers, and limited time allocated contractually to the Evaluation team. The team also visited communities and families which did not benefit from the program.

During the document review, interviews and field visits, the evaluation did some illustrative benchmarking against which CRDP design, implementation strategies and achievements could be assessed. For example, it analyzed the World Bank VNDP program[1], which aimed to promote local ownership of the development process in small communities. Implementation results provided evidence that capacity building in community planning for both Village Councils (VCs) and the communities involved is very time consuming, but is a very worthwhile investment of time and funds as it builds social capital, social solidarity, and a strong interface between the community and their local representatives. These outcomes have allowed the communities and VCs to leverage significant amounts of funds for their own projects.

The EU EJ[2] program supporting community service delivery also found that social capital created during the capacity building component was the most sustainable outcome. Average project size was US$1.8 million, of 18 months minimum implementation period with multi-sectoral, consortia-style institutional arrangements, allowing smaller NGOs to participate in their niche areas. The independent evaluation contains several conclusions and recommendations, the most relevant for CRDP's consideration are:

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[1] Village and Neighborhood Development Program, World Bank, 2013.
[2] Evaluation of the EU Programme, Supporting the delivery of services in East Jerusalem (2007- 2012), ABC Consulting, May 2012.

- The importance of building Palestinian ownership of the program to lead the process. This can be formalized in stages with the gradual addition of relevant Palestinian bodies (Ministries, Palestinian civil society) to the original Palestinian counterpart;
- A more structured approach to managing geographical and thematic coverage to generate multiplier effects;
- The importance of a coordinated donor response for a joint development purpose; and,
- A more strategic and structured approach to sustainability.

A review of the Agence Francaise de Developpement (AFD) program Increasing Resilience in Area C indicates that our analysis and recommendations are broadly coherent with the AFD's evaluation. Benchmarking of field projects (FAO –livestock project in Jericho, SHS in Hebron for example) highlighted the issue of sustainability: once project funding is finished, little is left of the project benefits when arrangements for sustainability (financial and technical) have not been built into the project design. By contrast, a Belgium-financed grid-extension to a Bedouin community is still operational after eight years as Belgium informed ICA that if any damage were done to the system this would seriously affect political relations between Belgium and Israel.

Other programmes of relevance were noted during the review, including the ongoing EU-funded creation of physical master plans for Area C communities (Strategic Development an Investment Planning), the World Bank funded Third Palestinian NGO Project (2009-2013) to create an effective NGO sector; the Belgian-funded local government decentralization/reform program focusing on amalgamation of small villages into collective service hubs, the multi-donor funded Deprived families Economic Empowerment Program (DEEP), which supports individual family livelihoods through micro loans and business development services.

3.   Evaluation Results
1. The CRDP has achieved the notable impact of having raised the awareness of the PA and the donor community of the importance of Area C and EJ for the implementation of the two-state solution outlined in the Oslo Accords (1993-1995). It triggered the annual reporting process to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee (AHLC) of the UN, which documents the conditions of Area C and EJ under Israeli occupation.
2. The CRDP is fundamentally a good program. Its comparative advantage is to have initiated a process of legitimization of donor development interventions, as compared to the prevailing humanitarian assistance.
3. It is a high-risk program but its sustainability is questionable unless progress is made on the two-state solution that would transfer Area C and EJ to the PA, as envisaged in the Oslo Accords.
4. Initial financial support to CRDP was modest although CRDP's goal and objectives are very relevant and bold, but the design of the program fell short of putting in place the elements and operational procedures needed to reach them. In particular:
5. Two significant gaps were noted in program outputs: human capital development, and institutional capacity building (including knowledge management), which are the foundations of resilience and sustainable development.
6. The call for proposals led to a high degree of fragmentation of project activities, which did

not permit to create the synergy and multiplier effect between interventions, in order to generate a critical mass of results.

7. The UNDP procedures (trenching of disbursements, contracting and reporting), applied by the PMU, were overly bureaucratic and did not allow for the flexibility needed in the context of Area C and East Jerusalem to respond to the needs on the ground. The PMU did agree to some funding reallocations in some cases, and the phasing has been discontinued in new projects.

8. The implementation arrangements are overly hierarchical and bureaucratic, leading to costly inefficiencies and a waste of time and resources.

9. Although the designers understood well that this was a high-risk program, CRDP's ability to react to and quickly and effectively resolve issues on the ground was impaired by the lack of a comprehensive and fully articulated risk-management structure where responsibilities and expectations of all stakeholders are clearly delineated and risk-response tools elaborated. This has had the effect of, to a greater or lesser extent, of , leaving the population participating in the program and the implementing partners to manage the risks themselves and deal with the Israeli occupation

10. The fundamentals of sustainability (technical, economic, policy, and social) were not fully integrated into the program design, and although implementing partners were asked to address the issue of sustainability, it was not adequately emphasized in the project's design nor pursued during implementation.

11. The program has been quite sensitive to integrating gender in the projects, although the number of projects with a systematic gender objective is too few as compared to UNDP's gender mainstreaming policy.

12. The PMU and implementing partners have been extremely dedicated. Improvements are needed in the PMU to focus more on field activities and results. UNDP's logistical, transportation and security requirements which restricts staff travel in areas with high security risk may have contributed to this. There is also a need to bring a stronger development perspective to the program. Implementing partners offer a range of experience and competencies. Knowledge sharing and networking among partners is weak and does not allow for systematic learning from implementation experience, neither to improve the performance of the current phase of the program nor for its continuation.

4.   Recommendations

The main recommendations are presented in two ways so that both the timing of and the responsibility for suggested changes are clearly delineated. Recommendations **1-4** consider the aspect of timing, recommendations **5 – 8** consider the aspect of responsibility of each stakeholder. Other detailed recommendations are contained in the body of the report.

1. **For the completion of the projects already selected from rounds 2 and 3,** a number of improvements should be brought about, in particular:
   - Request the partner to explain the measures that will be included in the project to ensure the sustainability of the project across the four sustainability parameters listed in the PD once the CRDP funding is completed.

- Request that each project set contingency funds aside for legal assistance to manage urgent risks. If unused, the necessary adjustment will be made in the final disbursement.
- Reduce the disbursement tranches: either 'pay as you go' up to 80% of the contract, and pay the remaining 20% upon satisfactory completion.
- Reduce the bureaucratic requirements to: one work plan at the beginning of the project (which should be attached to the contract), and two reports: one mid-term implementation report, and one completion report.
- Clarify the risk management responsibilities of the PMU, UNDP, PA, and Donors so that partners are not left on their own to find solutions.
- Organize two knowledge sharing workshops during the period, one as soon as possible so that round 3 projects partners can learn from rounds 1 and 2 partners.

2. **With the unallocated funds**, the PA and donors should **undertake a true pilot activity,** which could consist of the following:
- Select two geographical areas in two governorates to be served by the CRDP.
- Select two control areas in each governorate which will not be served by the CRDP (or by any similar donor-funded program).
- In each selected area, select the communities to be served, and identify control (unserved) communities.
- For each community, the full package of five outputs recommended (infrastructure, human development services, natural resources assets, livelihoods/employment and business creation, capacity building and knowledge management).
- The implementation partners could be selected competitively, through the formation of <u>consortia</u>, [3] including NGOs of all kinds, private sector firms, LGUs and other government services).
- The project would be designed on the basis of a solid baseline survey, and activities would be selected with a view to maximize resilience and sustainability criteria.
- The completion results of the pilot should be evaluated through qualitative and quantitative surveys in both the served and control communities in order to assess whether the comprehensive approach gives significant results on the potential resilience and sustainability in Area C and East Jerusalem.

3. The PA and CRDP donors should organize a major meeting (or series of meetings as appropriate) with the PA (including representatives from governorates), donors and implementers, to **share the knowledge** acquired from the CRDP, and **establish the commitment to a stronger and expanded CRDP program** as a major tool to give a chance to the two-state solution.

4. **Develop a full-fledged high-risk CRDP program**, strengthened along the following lines:

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[3] In EJ, there has been a positive experience of a consortium between NGOs, with COOPI, Al Hakawati, Saraya, and Spafford.

- Select interventions more strategically, i.e., in geographical areas particularly prone to annexation. This would imply intensifying the work on the five outputs described in the pilot, which are the pillars or building up resilience and sustainable development.
- Set up a risk management and response system that is recognized as a joint tool of the PA and the international community, anchored on the respect of international laws and the Oslo Accords. The aim would be to legitimize the work in those areas as development work instead of humanitarian work. At program level, establish a system which would detail the levels of intervention and the entity responsible to provide support, in the same way as alert systems are designed – from level 1 risk, which can be solved by the implementer, level 2 to be solved by Implementer + PMU, to levels 3 or 4, to be solved by program donors (UNDP + Sweden + Austria) and level 5 to be solved by a unified and broader community of donors (e.g., UN + Quartet + EU + bilateral donors). A 3-level response mechanism should be put in place (until some consensus on the 4th level is achieved with donors) so that the distribution of responsibility and the level of intervention expected are well understood by all stakeholders.
- Increase the accountability of the PA for Area C and EJ, by making the relevant PA institution the lead agency for the program and be accountable for donor mobilization for the program.
- Streamline the institutional structure, with an effective Program Board chaired by the PA; a strengthened PMU so that it both report directly to the PA lead institution and be accountable for development results; and a Technical Review Committee to advise the PMU. If proved feasible and effective, field implementation could be done through public/private consortia as described for the pilot.
- Increase donor support to the program within this unified institutional framework. All donors (including multilaterals like the World Bank and UN agencies) should see the merits of pooling their resources and efforts as a tool for effectively achieving the two-state solution.

5. **Joint recommendations for all CRDP stakeholders**

1. **Complete the implementation of the current phase of the CRDP, combining Recommendations 1 and 3 presented above**, i.e., complete the rounds 2-3 contracted projects with the proposed improvements, and use the balance of funds to pilot a new comprehensive approach with a design focused on resilience and sustainability criteria.

2. **Plan for a major meeting** (or series of meetings as appropriate) including PA representatives from governorates, donors and implementers, to share the knowledge acquired from the CRDP, and establish the commitment to a stronger and expanded CRDP program as a major tool to support the two-state solution.

3. **Support the development of a second phase of a full-fledged high risk CRDP program** which would be strengthened through a more strategic design and selection of project interventions in areas which are most prone to annexation, streamlining the funding cycles through creating a limited pool of pre qualified implementing partners

through an RFQ process, redefining and expanding program outputs which form the pillars of building up resilience and sustainable development, mandating human capital development and institutional capacity building components in all projects, setting up a risk management system and process that is recognized as a joint tool of the PA and the international community, anchored on the respect of international laws and the Oslo Accords, and streamlining of the institutional structure of CRDP to separate more clearly the functions of the SB and the RB so that accountability can be assured and decision-making can be expedited

4. **Agree a process whereby ownership and leadership of the CRDP process is gradually handed over to the PA** and other Palestinian institutions. A diagram of the proposed institutional option compared to the current option is presented in Annex 8

6. Recommendations for the PA

1. **Identify and clarify the risk management capabilities** and responsibilities and of the PA in Area C so that the PA can play an effective role in the CRDP risk management system and process alongside donors and implementers.
2. **Request a special meeting** of the RB/SB to discuss the evaluations recommendations and their implications for the future work of CRDP.
3. **Ensure that the recommendations of the evaluation which are adopted are disseminated** to all involved line Ministries including the MOLG, MOJA and MOA so that the consensus necessary to implement new approaches can be rapidly built.
4. **Develop additional capacity within the PA lead institution** so that the PA is able to provide effective oversight and management of CRDP operations.
5. **Ensure the continuing and effective synergy of interventions in Area C** at national level through coordination as possible with all other instruments operating in Area C and promoting the CRDP program in all relevant donor forums as a major tool to support the two-state solution.
6. **Organize in collaboration with CRDP donors a major meeting** (or series of meetings as appropriate) with PA representation at governorate level, donors and implementers to share the knowledge gained from CRDP implementation and to establish a commitment to a stronger an expanded CRDP program as a major tool to give a chance to the two-state solution.

7. Recommendations for UNDP

1. **Organise a special meeting of the RB/SB** to discuss the recommendations of the evaluation and their implications for the present and future work of CRDP.
2. **Continue to address the already identified knowledge and experience gaps** of the PMU in the areas of technical support (including gender) ,UNDP procedures, contracting modalities, civil society competencies which UNDP is well placed to manage through training and mentoring arrangements.
3. **Complete the implementation of projects already selected from Rounds 2 and 3 with the following improvements:**

a. Share with implementing partners the four sustainability parameters listed in the PD and request grantees to fully detail the measures included in their project to ensure the sustainability across these and request that they report against progress towards sustainability in their project reporting.

b. Request each implementing partner to set contingency funds aside for legal assistance and to understand and manage urgent risks. If unused, necessary adjustments will be made in final disbursement

c. Reduce number of disbursement tranches and bureaucratic requirements

d. Clarify the risk management responsibilities of all stakeholders through the establishment and activation of a risk management system and inform implementing partners.

e. Analyze emerging trends and lessons from mitigation strategies in place to inform the response mechanism put in place.

f. During the implementation period, organize two knowledge sharing workshops – one immediately – so that round 3 project partners can learn from rounds 1 and 2.

4. **Redefine the project outputs** along the five new themes, including knowledge management.

5. **Review grant templates and operational procedures** for modifications needed to implement the recommendations approved. In particular:

   a. modify the Call for Proposals (CFP) document to include separate criteria for sustainability as part of the evaluation criteria, and/ or spell out in detail the factors which make up "Quality of project" criteria. Move the sustainability and exit strategy section of the CFP form up front.

   b. add connectedness of project beneficiaries to communities and institutions in Area A and B as an additional parameter within the sustainability framework in the PD.

   c. mandate project partners in the CFP to include human capital development and institutional capacity building components in their project.

   d. add criteria to CFP, mandating partners to ensure that their beneficiary coverage is inclusive in any one community for projects which create private goods, and/or target the poorest households within these communities using criteria which are transparent and acceptable to the community.

   e. modify the OM to reflect the new contracting flexibility and review Annexes so that they align with any modification in the CFP, reporting formats.

   f. add the RRF and the Sustainability Parameters to the CFP package.

6. **Review the current outcome indicators** in the CRDP Results and Resource Framework to ensure that self-perceptions of increased resilience (e.g. additional development opportunities perceived, reduced concerns over displacement, additional linkages with and active cooperation with other actors) are included to provide evidence that project activities support the achievement of program goals and objectives, and inform on-going programming and replicability potential.

7. **With the unallocated funds**, lead the technical development, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of **an authentic pilot activity** (as described in 2 above) using modified CFP documents, grant templates and operational procedures. A

thorough stakeholder mapping (analysis, key design and stakeholder engagement considerations) in the areas selected for the pilot should be undertaken. The results of such mapping could be used to focus and inform the next call for proposals, and possibly test new institutional arrangements, in particular to deal with legal and capacity building issues.

8. **Manage an independent pre and post pilot project evaluation** in both the served and control communities in order to assess whether the comprehensive approach gives significant results on the potential resilience and sustainability in Area C and East Jerusalem.

9. **Organize a major meeting** (or series of meetings as appropriate) including PA representatives from the governorate level, current and potential donors, implementers on MOPAD's request to share knowledge gained from the CRDP implementing experience to establish a commitment to stronger and expanded CRDP program as a major tool to support the two-state solution.

8. Recommendations for Donors

1. **Provide increased levels of donor support** to the CRDP program within a unified and streamlined institutional framework. All donors (including multilaterals like the World Bank and UN agencies) should see the merits of pooling their resources and efforts as a tool for effectively achieving the two-state solution.

2. **Promote CRDP as a major tool** to support the two-state solution in all relevant donor forums.

3. **Advocate for - and lend practical support through enforcement to - measures** which confer immediate and longer term protection for communities in Area C, including their land, water sources, shelter, access to markets, schools, health and social services.

Chapter I: Introduction

1. Summary presentation of the CRDP

Historical Background[4]. The Community Resilience Development Program (CRDP) is the result of a three-year process initiated by the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) in 2009. In 2009, when the EU was under Swedish presidency, the importance of Area C under the two State Solution was accorded priority by Sweden. which was reiterated by Sweden in 2011, following their analysis of the Palestinian National Development Plan. A process designed to practically address the issue of Area C was subsequently initiated beginning with the EU Heads of Mission report on Area C and the EU Council Conclusions of May 14, 2012 which was paralleled by the PA placing the issue of Area C on the agenda of subsequent AHLC meetings. The result of this process was the creation of the CRDP by the PA[5]. At that time, Sweden started questioning the validity of its humanitarian assistance, and prompted the EU to undertake a similar re-examination of its aid to the OPTs. However, while the EU opted to determine its assistance on the basis of 'Master Plans[6]', including local master plans, as requested by the Israeli Civil Administration (ICA), Sweden decided it would take the risk of launching a program that would undertake legitimate actions for the development of Area C and East Jerusalem, that is actions which did not need ICA's prior approval but would support phasing out humanitarian aid to the benefit of development aid. These would include actions that would enable the Palestinian population to safeguard their livelihoods, preserve their basic civil rights, remain on their land and have access to education, health and housing.

Sweden's pursued three goals, all in support of the two-state solution negotiated as part of the Oslo Accords:

(i) To make its aid evolve from humanitarian aid to development assistance;

(ii) To challenge the PA to take charge of Area C and East Jerusalem; and

(iii) To give the Palestinians of Area C and East Jerusalem a chance to stay on their land and live on it productively and with dignity.

After lengthy discussions with various UN agencies such as UNSCO and OCHA, the PA and Sweden selected The United Nations Development Program as the executing agency to launch such a program, on account of its development experience. The UK joined in 2013. Austria joined the program in 2013 and subscribed to the selection of UNDP because of its experience with risk management. Norway joined in December, after the completion of this evaluation.

Objectives. The CRDP was therefore designed to meet the overall objective (outcome) " to empower local stakeholders in Area C and East Jerusalem, through the most appropriate partners (LNGOs, INGOs), to act with resilience to respond to threats that affect their sustenance on the land", with three specific objectives:

iv) Prevent the erosion of living conditions of Palestinians in Area C and East Jerusalem that undermines their development capital;

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[4]This section draws on the written documentation reviewed, as well as interviews with SIDA and UNDP staff. Note that this section records facts and processes not previously registered in the CRDP Program Document.
[5]Interviews with SIDA and UNDP. See Annex 1.
[6]The EU has prepared a Master Plan for East Jerusalem, but not for Area C.

v)   Protect Palestinian land and property in Area C and East Jerusalem; and

vi)   Mitigate and ideally reverse the migration flow from Area C and East Jerusalem by enhancing human security and the livelihood of Palestinians.

The preparation of the CRDP was executed through close collaboration between the Palestinian Authority through the Ministry of Planning and Administrative Development (MOPAD), the United Nations Development Program/Program of Assistance to the Palestinian People (UNDP/PAPP), and the Government of Sweden.

The program is structured along four major outputs:

(v)   Output 1: Public and social infrastructure in Area C and EJRM are improved;

(vi)   Output 2: Access to and protection of natural resources is improved;

(vii)   Output 3: Economic opportunities are enhanced through support to livelihoods in Area C and EJRM; and,

(viii)   Output 4: Rights of Palestinian citizens in Area C and EJRM are upheld through legal protection, advocacy, and community participation and mobilization.

The program was to be implemented through projects to be identified and selected through a competitive system of calls for proposals.

A four-tier institutional structure was adopted for the program execution:

i)   A Steering Committee PA ministers and heads of donor agencies to provide the program's overall policy direction;

ii)   A Review Board, co-chaired by MOPAD and UNDP, comprising representatives from the PA and donor agencies, was to make decisions on the selection of projects;

iii)   A program implementation unit (PMU) was to be set up to undertake the overall program management and field supervision. And,

iv)   International and local non-governmental organizations (I/NGOs) and community-based organizations (CBOs) were expected to develop and implement projects at field level.

In addition, technical support to the PMU was to be provided by the technical staff of UNDP from East Jerusalem. Periodic monitoring reports would be prepared by field-levels implementers, and collated and sent to the members of the Steering Committee by the PMU. At the end of each project, a completion report would be prepared to assess the projects achievements, impacts, and lessons learned.

The current funding for the program amounts to U$16.81 million of which $13.74 million from Sweden, US$0.45 from the UK US$2.48 from Austria [7] , and US$ O.15 from UNDP. Implementation started in September 2012 and is scheduled for completion by September 2015.

2. Background to the Mid-term Evaluation and its Terms of Reference

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[7] In 2012, an agreement was signed between the Government of Sweden and UNDP/PAPP so as to support a three-year program (from 2012 to 2015), with a total amount of SEK 90,000,000, equivalent to around USD 13,717,420. In the same year, the UK's Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) joined the program and provided £300,000, equivalent to USD 453,172 for the first year of the program. In 2013, the government of Austria joined the program and contributed €1,900,000, equivalent to around USD 2,620,691, to support the program for two years.

The program agreement signed between Sweden and UNDP makes reference to the evaluation of the program[8]. The reference to an independent Midterm Evaluation is only made in Section V of the Program Document (PD).

As per the terms of reference issued by UNDP[9]**the overall objective** of the Midterm Evaluation is to independently evaluate and assess the level of progress made towards achieving the outputs and outcomes listed in the program document.

More specifically the assignment will:
- **Assess** the relevance of the program in the context of the oPt and validate results achieved against the program document and the M&E plan.
- **Provide** a comprehensive assessment of the overall impact of the program, both at the supply and the demand side of the development in Area C and East Jerusalem.
- **Appraise** UNDP/PAPP's relations with relevant actors and stakeholders, particularly to the CRDP's program management unit, donors and the PA.
- **Assess** if and how activities have been carried out in a mutual reinforcing manner, including vis-à-vis other interventions in Area C and East Jerusalem.
- **Appraise** the sustainability of the program, including the institutionalization of interventions.
- **Review** the program's efforts to mainstream gender and ensure the application of UNDP's rights-based approach.
- **Discuss** the main challenges face by the program, including the ways in which UNDP/PAPP has sought to overcome them. Describe and analyze current challenges to implementing transition/development interventions in area C and in general and CRDP activities in particular.
- **Assess** relevance and utilization of M&E Processes
- **Offer** a comprehensive risk assessment, including UNDP/PAPP's ability to manage existing risks effectively and responsibly. Refer to the risk analysis matrix as part of the program document and how it was put into action.
- **Capture** lessons learned and best practices and provide concrete recommendations' for program's planning of future interventions, in addition to subsequent phases.
- **Look** into other unforeseen or foreseen external factors that affected and slowed down the implementations of CRDP.

SIDA commented that the Midterm Evaluation should have been carried out in April 2014, that is, 18 months after the beginning of program implementation. As a result, the recommendations of the Evaluation will be presented into two categories: the recommendations which can help improve the performance of the program during the last year of implementation, and the recommendations which can be used for the continuation of the program into a new phase.

The evaluation team acknowledges that some of the steps recommended in this report to enhance programme delivery have already been identified and are being put in place. These are noted in the narrative.

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[8] MOPAD's responsibility for the Program Evaluation, including the Midterm Evaluation, is unclear.
[9] UNDP. RFQ-2014-180, Annex 3

3. Presentation of the Report

After this introduction, Chapter II presents the evaluation analytical framework and methodology, and Chapter III reviews the political, socio-economic and institutional context in which the CRDP was developed. Chapter IV provides the evaluation analysis, and Chapter V the conclusions, challenges and recommendations for the way forward. The list of people met by the Evaluation team, the team's work program, the bibliography and the evaluation tools are given respectively in Annexes I-IV. Annexes V and VI provide details of the calls for proposals and of the project portfolio. Annex VII presents findings from the field visits.

Chapter II: Evaluation Analytical Framework and Methodology

This chapter presents the analytical framework and the methodology used by the Midterm Evaluation. The first section reviews the two basic concepts used to design the CRDP: resilience and sustainable development, as well as the key operational parameters. The second section presents the analytical framework used by the Midterm Evaluation, and the third section outlines the methodology.

1. Analytical Framework

1.1 Basic Concepts used to design the CRDP

Resilience and sustainable development are referenced in the Program Document as the two basic concepts used to design the CRDP, but neither concept was defined in the context of Area C and East Jerusalem. The evaluation team therefore (a) interviewed various stakeholders on their understanding of resilience and development; and (b) reviewed some of the literature on resilience and development (see Annex III, Bibliography). Although a proper definition of these concepts is necessary to define the program objectives and outcomes, it became clear that there were various interpretations of these concepts amongst stakeholders, and that there was no unified view as to the expected outcomes from the program. The discussion also introduced the notion of 'steadfastness', which is also used in some documents[10], albeit without proper definition. This is consistent with the fact that humanitarian and aid agencies are still debating the definition of resilience.

The literature highlights that *resilience* is a term increasingly employed throughout a number of sciences, from psychology and ecology, to business administration, sociology, disaster planning, urban planning, and international development, to name a few; more recently, the concept of resilience is at the heart of the climate change debate. The development literature highlights the role of infrastructure, human capital, social/institutional capital, and access to economic and financial assets and markets in building up the resilience of individuals and communities to recover from stress such as natural disasters, in the shortest time possible, and to manage long-term threats such as climate change, in order to continue on a positive socio-economic development path. The United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNISDR) defines resilience as: "The ability of a system, community or society exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate to and recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely and efficient manner, including through the preservation and

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[10]For example, 'steadfastness' is used in the latest report of the State of Palestine to the AHLC: Rebuilding Hope. September 22, 2014. After doing some research, it appears that there is no standard sociological or cultural definition, but that the Palestinian interpretation of 'steadfastness' is maintaining the Palestinian Identity.

restoration of its essential basic structures and functions"[11]. The PA's own definition of resilience is weakly defined in its strategy documents, although it does note that the concept of resilience is multi-dimensional and encompasses the notion of reducing the migration of Palestinians from their land in the face of Israeli attacks.[12] For UNDP, resilience is seen as process whereby the economic and institutional vulnerabilities driven by a range of macro economic and structural factors, are addressed and communities and individuals are empowered to develop self reliance beyond dependence on food assistance and temporary employment generation programs. The notion of mobilizing self organization to build local resilience is also embraced.[13] In the context of Palestine, the process of resilience makes explicit the political aspects of vulnerability and requires an analysis of the various impacts of Israeli occupation on the community.

The evaluation team has therefore interpreted resilience in the context of Area C and East Jerusalem, as the ability of Palestinians, at the individual or collective level (a) to recover from the chronic stress of occupation, such as the lack of permits to develop infrastructure to meet basic needs, or from periodic crises such as destruction of physical assets and confiscations of land and water resources; (b) to continue to develop without losing their national identity; and (c) to access assets (physical, financial, and human capital) as well as services to recover from crises and thrive. With respect to *sustainable development*, the evaluation team as adopted the most common definition i.e.," social, economic, environmental, and institutional systems interact in a way to meet the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs"[14]. Applied to Area C and East Jerusalem, this definition implies that expected outcome from the CRDP would be that the social, economic, environmental and political conditions are in place to meet the needs of the Palestinians presently living in Area C and EJ as well as the needs of the future generations of Palestinians.

1.2 Analytical Framework

Graph I[15] presented below illustrates functioning levels in context of stress (or adverse events), as well as the link between resilience (recovery) and development (thriving). Adapted to the objective of the CRDP, this means that actions under the CRDP would assist to (a) not only strengthen the communities of Area C and EJ to sustain and recover from the continuing effects and ever present threats of occupation policies so that they would no longer survive with impairment, as is the case at present, or possibly succumb over time, as would be the case with full annexation; but (b) create the conditions for those communities to thrive, i.e., the two-state solution would be implemented. Applied to aid, the evolution from resilience to development would mean a change from providing humanitarian to development assistance, which was one of Sweden's goals in supporting the launching of the program.

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[11]United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD). 2010. Combating Poverty and Inequality: Structural Change, Social Policy and Politics. http://www.unrisd.org/publications/cpi

[12] National Agriculture Sector Strategy: "Resilience and Development", 2014-2016, Palestinian Ministry of Agriculture.

[13] Development for freedom; Empowered lives, resilient nation, UNDPs consolidated plan of assistance to the Palestinian People, 2012- 2014

[14]World Bank: What is Sustainable Development? http://www.worldbank.org/depweb/english/sd.html

[15]Carver, Charles S., 1998. Resilience and Thriving: Issues, Models, and Linkages. Journal of Social Issues. Vol. 54, No.2, pp. 245-266.

Graph 1: Impacts of Stress or Adverse Events

For the purpose of the Midterm Evaluation, a key question is therefore whether the CRDP's has the potential to achieve both outcomes: resilience and sustainable development.

The Midterm Evaluation has applied the standard DAC criteria for the evaluation of the CRDP, i.e., relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact, and sustainability. In addition, the Evaluation has carefully reviewed the use of the logical framework applied by UNDP for the design of the program, which aims to link a program goal and expected results with the actions to be taken in order to achieve the goal and results. One important element is to clearly identify the conditions and assumptions for success or the constraints. Using the Logical Framework model summarized in Graph 1 in Annex 4. The Evaluation specifically focused on whether the outcomes and assumptions for the program were clearly specified at the onset, and whether the risks and vulnerabilities were adequately conceptualized.

1.3 Methodology

The Midterm Evaluation was carried out using the following methodology:

(i)   A literature review, comprising a comprehensive review of all the documentation provided by UNDP, the PMU, and people met. In addition, the team carried out its own research of PA documents, bilateral and multilateral agencies publications, as well as academic literature. The bibliography is attached as Annex III.

(ii)   Individual interviews: 20 interviews were carried out with stakeholders representing donors, implementers, beneficiaries, and other relevant informants.

(iii)   Focus groups: three focus groups were conducted: one with representatives from implementing agencies from EJ, one with representatives from implementing agencies from Area C, and one with a group of beneficiaries. The list of people met through interviews and the list of participants in focus groups is given in Annex I. The results of focus groups are summarized in Annex 7.

(iv)   Field visits.7 projects were visited. The projects were selected by the evaluation team using a rigorous methodology in order to: cover all the geographical areas of Area C, East Jerusalem, and the Seam Zone; reach a balanced coverage of the four program outputs, and within each output get exposed to different issues; get exposed to the full range of implementers, INGOs, LNGOs, and CBOs. The team agreed with the PMU

on the list of field visits in order to get the contacts with the implementers, and finalized the program based on time, distance, and the availability of implementers' staff. During field visits, the team met with beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries where possible (used as control group). A rapid appraisal methodology through group and individual in-depth interviews was used, and preferred to formal beneficiaries' focus groups as proposed in the inception report. Separate meetings were held with women where appropriate. The list of field visits is given as Annex II.

(v) A debriefing meeting was held on September 28, towards the end of the field work, to obtain the PMU's feedback on the team's preliminary observations.

(vi) A draft report was discussed at a meeting with the CRDP-Steering Committee, held on November 5, 2014. Further comments were received on the draft report from SIDA on November 15th, 2014 and from UNDP and CRDP management on December 15th, 2014. The feedback received was integrated into the final report.

The Evaluation team had to overcome a number of difficulties in carrying out the work within the agreed time-frame. The field work was delayed as the clearance of the inception report by UNDP was not received until the second week of planned field work and the responses to requests submitted to the PMU to obtain the documents were not always synergized with field research needs. Fewer than expected implementers responded to the invitation for the focus groups, especially for the focus group on Area C, which is somewhat surprising. They may not have understood the importance of their participation for the Midterm Evaluation.

More significantly, there is a serious issue with the data. Data and statistics on Area C are difficult to reconcile because of the differing understandings of what parts of Area Care truly available for development, the various methodologies used (representative sample versus surveys), and the use of terminology that is not precisely defined. Data accuracy and terminology precision may not be important to the organizations supporting humanitarian assistance (help people in crisis situation), but is indispensable for development work. For example, even though the PMU uses maps and data from OCHA, there is not a single document provided by the CRDP-PMU which presents clearly the distribution of the land area in the West Bank, in Area C or the localization of projects in Area C and EJ. Although OCHA has made a major effort in producing maps (the team collected them and found them most useful), they are not detailed enough to easily do fieldwork[16]. Information on the demographics of Area C and EJ is also very fluid, in spite of the PCBS numerous studies. Data on infrastructure and natural resources are also very fragmented. This question of data should be addressed for the continuation of the program, including the need to develop project and program level indicators which can measure the beneficiary behaviours around, and perceptions of, program investments as they relate to increasing resilience (see Section 2.7.3 Recommendations (M&E reporting systems and tools) and Section 6.3, Recommendations (Knowledge Generation)).

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[16]In Hebron, the team got lost for two hours for lack of maps and clear arrangements to reach one of the communities.

Chapter III: Understanding the Context to the CRDP

This chapter includes three sections. The first section reviews the political context in which the CRDP was developed. The second section presents the socio-economic context of Area C and East Jerusalem in order to understand the types of activities selected to implement the program's outputs. The third section summarizes the institutional context that led to the selection of institutional arrangements for the program.

1. Political Context to the CRDP

Since the Oslo Accords signed in 1993 and 1995, the West Bank has been divided into three areas: Area A, under the control of the Palestinian Authority (PA), Area B, under the joint control of the PA and Israel, and Area C, under the sole control of Israel. The Accords stipulated that Area B and C would be progressively transferred to the PA within a three to five year period. After 1995, the PA focused on Areas A and B, while the donors earmarked them for development assistance and Area C and East Jerusalem were earmarked for humanitarian assistance.

In 2009, SIDA started questioning the justification for limiting its assistance to the populations of Area C and East Jerusalem to humanitarian assistance. Sweden also challenged the PA and the donor community that the prevailing approach was de facto supporting Israel's progressive annexation of the lands of Area C and East Jerusalem, namely through the significant implantation of large settlements, whose population increased from 198,000 in 1995 to 550,000 by 2014[17]. Sweden prompted a similar re-examination of the European Union's assistance strategy, which culminated in 2011 when the PA submitted its draft budgetary request to the donors: Area C and East Jerusalem were completely left out. As a result, the EU initiated the preparation of an annual report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee (ADHLC) of the UN, which for the first time addressed the situation of the Palestinians living in Area C and East Jerusalem in an international forum.

There was no agreement, neither amongst government ministers nor amongst donors on how to move forward. Even though Prime Minister Fayyad was in favor of launching a low-key program of investments in Area C and East Jerusalem, i.e., a program that would focus on the provision of basic infrastructure services and other activities to strengthen the sources of livelihoods for the Palestinians living in these areas, some of his ministers opposed the idea lest donor funding would be diverted from Areas A and B to the benefit of Area C and EJ. The donors were also unable to reach a consensus. Some donors were already engaged in both areas while others, namely the European Union (as a group) wanted to follow the rules imposed by Israel, i.e., the preparation of master plans and the process of obtaining permits. As a result, Sweden basically decided to take risks, and commit funding with the hope that other donors would come on board. The PA designated the Ministry of Planning and Administrative Development as the government counterpart, and no other ministry initially officially supported the program. By the end of the first year of implementation, CRDP recognized the need for greater level of inter-ministerial input into the design and selection of project interventions to more precisely identify needs and sectoral synergies across national sectoral plans, and to more efficiently crosscheck interventions for duplication. Representatives of the MOLG, MOA and MOJA joined the RB with the inputs of the MOE and the MOH centralized through the MOLG. Although this led to some delay in the project

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[17]These figures are for the West Bank. Source: State of Palestine. Rebuilding Hope. 2014 Report to the AHLC.

approval process, the value-added of broader input was acknowledged and the challenges of such an integrated approach in terms of management of sector priorities in the context of Area C are slowly being overcome.

MOPAD

Recent Developments. In 2013, the World Bank issued a report titled "Area C and the future of the Palestinian Economy". This report highlighted the economic importance of Area C for the Palestinian economy and as corner-stone of the two-state solution. This report seems to have invigorated the Palestinian government to focus on the development of Area C[18]. In 2014, the Government of Palestine has prepared a "National Strategic Framework for Development Policies and Interventions in 'Area C' (2014-16). According to the 2014 report to the AHLC, "The political and policy premise of the Framework centers on the fact that 'Area C' is central for the realization of an independent state of Palestine and that the challenges and obstacles imposed by the Israeli occupation must be confronted"…in order to enable "economic development, social justice, and a decent life for Palestinians in their homeland". "The purpose of the National Strategic Framework is to safeguard the principle of the two-state solution by striving for the integrity of the Palestinian territory within the pre-June 1967 borders."[19]

The legal context within which CRDP interventions take place in Area C affect which type of interventions are considered possible (low risk, permit free) and in what localities these risks are judged to be manageable. For example, the ACTED land rehabilitation originally targeted land that had been declared State Land by an Israeli military order. ACTED was requested to change the location and beneficiaries before project start up. For a fuller understanding of the legal context and its implications on project selection[20]

2. Socio-economic context of Area C and East Jerusalem.

As a result of the 1967 war, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip came under the control of the Israeli army with many aspects of Palestinian life such as mobility, employment, and business development determined by the Israeli Army and the Civil Administration. The civil unrest caused by such procedures culminated in the 1987 'Intifada,' and the uprising continued until direct peace talks were held between the Palestinians and the Government of Israel in Oslo in 1993. The Oslo accords (1993 and 1995) entailed a plan for the establishment of a Palestinian State where localities in the West Bank and Gaza were divided into 3 areas: A, B, and C. The Palestinian Authority (PA) would theoretically be autonomous in Area A, possess civil autonomy but no security control in area B, and have no control at all in area C, which is largest of the three areas and encompasses more than half of the West Bank and Gaza.[21] To this day, the PA does not have complete sovereignty in the West Bank and Gaza, mostly due to the fact that Israeli authorities initiated policies of economic and political segregation involving Gaza, East Jerusalem and Area C, culminating in the building of the separation barrier around the West Bank, which in turn created a 'Seam Zone' of land trapped between the Wall built by Israel and the Green Line (1967 Armistice

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[18]The report to AHLC does not address the issue of East Jerusalem. The PNDP (2011-2013) had already endorsed the Strategic Multisectoral Development Plan for EJ completed in March 2011, with support from the EU.

[19]Source: State of Palestine. Rebuilding Hope. 2014 Report to the AHLC.

[20] Policy Briefing: Area C , Policy Department – Directorate General for External Policies, European Parliament. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/briefing_note/join/2013/491495/EXPO-AFET_SP(2013)491495_EN.pdf

[21] Specifically, according to OCHA reports, Area C covers some 3,400 km^2 and represents almost 61% of the West Bank

line). Such policies play a large role in severely hindering the growth and development prospects of both of Area C and East Jerusalem (EJ), as well as the quality of life and dignity of the people living in these areas.

2.1 Constraints to socio-economic development

Palestinians have limited access to productive assets in Area C and East Jerusalem. According to the World Bank 2013 Report (para.9): "Less than 1 percent of Area C, which is already built up, is designated by the Israeli authorities for Palestinian use; the remainder is heavily restricted or off-limits to Palestinians, with 68 percent reserved for Israeli settlements, c. 21 percent for closed military zones, and c. 9 percent for nature reserves (approximately 10 percent of the West Bank, 86 percent of which lies in Area C). These areas are not mutually exclusive, and overlap in some cases. In practice it is virtually impossible for Palestinians to obtain construction permits for residential or economic purposes, even within existing Palestinian villages in Area C: the application process has been described by an earlier World Bank report (2008) as fraught with "ambiguity, complexity and high cost". The same is true for the extraction of natural resources and development of public infrastructure.

The mobility of Palestinians in Area C is controlled and severely hampered by a large set of obstacles, including barriers, checkpoints, roadblocks and a permit system, which continues to destabilize livelihoods and access to basic services. Quality of life in Area C is also largely driven by the Israeli authorities' practices, including settlement activity, and a prejudiced planning regime, all of which continue to "impede Palestinian access to livelihoods, shelter and basic services and assistance, including health, education and water and sanitation services."[22]As a result, Palestinian communities living in Area C face constant disruptions to their livelihoods, leading to poverty and high levels of aid dependency.

East Jerusalemites on the other hand face obstacles that are specific to the status of East Jerusalem as an occupied territory annexed to Israel. From a legal standpoint, Palestinian Jerusalemites are considered "permanent residents" under Israeli law. The differential legal status of Palestinian Jerusalemites compared to Palestinians in Area C and those under Palestinian Authority jurisdiction and compared to Israeli settlers in East Jerusalem entails an array of further hindrances, especially with regards to housing, employment, taxation and representation. Another significant obstacle to the development of the economy of East Jerusalem is the lack of Palestinian access to finance due to discriminatory fiscal policies, including access to housing loans from Palestinian banks.[23] Palestinian Jerusalemites also receive a disproportionately smaller share of municipal services than their Israeli neighbors in West Jerusalem[24].

2.2 Demographics.

There is a wide range of estimates as to the numbers of Palestinians living in Areas C and EJ. It is estimated that 297,900 people live in 532 residential areas in Area C[25], encompassing some the most impoverished communities. These figures exclude Palestinians from Area C who live in Areas

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[22]OCHA (2013), *Area C Vulnerability Profile*.

[23] UNCTAD, *The Palestinian economy in East Jerusalem: Enduring annexation, isolation and disintegration, presentation by Mahmoud El Khafif, Ankara, 12-13 May 2014.*

[24]EU HOMS Report on Jerusalem, March 18, 2014

[25]*2013 Vulnerability Profile Project (VPP) headed by OCHA*

A and B. The city of East Jerusalem is host to 360,882 Palestinian inhabitants, – as of 2012[26] – who comprise 38% of Jerusalem's total population, who in turn suffer from high poverty levels, limited employment opportunities, and a severely degraded educational system.

2.3 Incomes.

For the communities surveyed as part of the UNDP, MOPAD and Birzeit community assessment report[27], the average household income was estimated at approximately NIS 2,000 per month, an amount that is relatively uniform across all communities. This seems to be somewhat at odds with the UNRWA, UNICEF, WFP Household Survey for Communities in Area C carried out in 2010, which states that the average monthly income of Bedouin and herder communities in Area C is 1,024 NIS (US$ 277). The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics estimates that as of 2011, the average daily wage in NIS for wage employees in East Jerusalem was NIS 109 per day. At first sight, this seems to compare favorably with the NIS 77.8 daily wages for the Palestinian Territories as a whole. However, the higher living standards of Jerusalem compared to the West Bank and Gaza means residents of East Jerusalem face more difficult economic conditions (more on this below). Wages cited by Palestinians working on settlements are a fraction of the Israeli legal minimum hourly wage of NIS23.12.

2.4 Employment.

According to the UNDP, MOPAD and Birzeit community assessment report[28] which covered 100 communities in Area C, the main sources of income for the surveyed households include livestock rearing and home-based dairy production. Livestock rearing and home-based dairy production are the main sources of income for residents in 71 of the communities surveyed, while crop farming brings in income for residents of 52 of the communities. For residents from 24 communities, work in Israel or Israeli settlements was reported as the main source of income. Few laborers obtain the necessary work permits required by the Israeli authorities, which places them under constant threat of arrest. Their status as illegal laborers also puts them at increased risk of exploitation by their Israeli employers who are not obliged to apply labor laws, and often pay these workers less than the minimum wage paid to Israeli workers. The same community assessment reports states that within the communities surveyed, unemployment levels were at around 40%. While there are no official unemployment rates for Palestinians in East Jerusalem, as the statistics compiled by the Israeli authorities do not differentiate between Arab and Jewish residents, a report by the Association for Civil Rights in Israel[29], citing the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, do present data on the percentages of Jewish and Arab residents that participate in the "civilian work force." These data indicate that 40% of the male Arab population in Jerusalem does not participate in the labor market, while for females it is as high as 85%. A report by the Palestinian Authority Jerusalem Unit in 2010 estimated that 35% of Palestinian Jerusalemites work in Israel and the settlements.

2.5 Access to Social Services.

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[26]UNCTAD (2013).*The Palestinian Economy in East Jerusalem: Enduring annexation, isolation and disintegration*.
[27]UNDP, MOPAD, Birzeit Center for Continuing Education. (2013) "FINAL REPORT: Assessment of the Current Situation and of the Development Priorities of 100 Communities in Area C" Community Resilience and Development Programme for Area C and East Jerusalem (CRDP) report
[28] ibid
[29]Alyan, Nisreen and Sela, Norit and Pomerantz, Michal (2012). *Policies of Neglect in East Jerusalem: The Policies that created 78% Poverty Rates and a Frail Job Market.* The Association for Civil Rights in Israel.

Lack of access to basic services is a severe issue for both Area C and EJ residents. In Area C, 55% of Bedouin and herder communities are food insecure[30], while 41% of Bedouin and herder communities of Area C do not have a source of electricity, and women of 60% of herding communities' households in Area C use wood as the main cooking source of energy.[31] According to the UN WFP, the picture is bleaker, with 79% of the herding population in Area C food insecure, and the prevalence of wasted, underweight and stunted children between six and 59 months is 5.9%, 15.3% and 28.5% respectively compared to 1.7%, 3.2% and 7.9% in the West Bank. Overall, 60 communities out of 271 (22%) in Area C are not being provided with adequate health services due to access restrictions.[32] This is corroborated by an Oxfam UNDP report[33], stating similar figures, which in turn shows that 77% of Area C households were reliant on buying food on credit and 81% had decreased spending on food. Moreover, only 28% of Area C households receive water through network supply, and 41% of households in Area C do not have a source of electricity.

An UNCTAD 2013 report[34] shows that access by East Jerusalemites to education and health is restricted, which impacts the quality human capital. Inequalities in municipal funding within Jerusalem itself means that Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem face a shortage of classrooms and between 4,329 and 5,300 Palestinian children in East Jerusalem do not attend school at all.[35] Around half of East Jerusalem's residents do not have legal water connections and a third is not connected to the sewage network, contributing to the environmental degradation of Palestinian neighborhoods and exacerbating risks to public health.[36]

2.6 Poverty.

According to the Association for Civil Rights in Israel report, 78% of Palestinians living in the Jerusalem district and 84% of the children live below the poverty line, representing the worst rate of all time. This seems to be corroborated by a 2010 EU report[37] which states that in East Jerusalem, 75.3% of Palestinian adults and 83.1% of Palestinian children live below the poverty line.

3. Institutional Context

No PA institutions operating in EJ and the PA has currently any jurisdiction in Area C, although small local government structures do exist in larger communities and limited government health, education, social and policing services are provided. In EJ, an impressive range of donor-funded LNGOs, CBOs and INGOs provide social services and development programs to the community. In contrast, few LNGOs or CBOs are based in Area C. However, these institutions -along with INGOs - do provide donor-funded humanitarian assistance to communities and have built up considerable experience of how best to meet community needs, which go beyond addressing humanitarian vulnerabilities. As a result, the institutional environment in both areas lacks the coherence, and Area C lacks the institutional assets and operational structures found in Areas A and B.

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[30] Food Security and Nutrition Survey of Herding Communities in Area C, UNRWA, UNICEF, WFP, data from 2010
[31] UNRWA, UNICEF, WFP Household Survey for Communities in Area C, 2010
[32] WHO, WHO Area C – Assessment of Health Needs, 2011
[33] UNDP (2011). "The ADCR 2011: Human Deprivation under Occupation." Oxfam, Arab Development Challenges Report Background Paper 2011/12
[34] Ibid
[35] The Association for Civil Rights in Israel & Iramin 2010
[36] EWASH 2011
[37] EU 2010

The PA has focused its assistance – supported by significant donor contributions – in Areas and B since 1994, and has been cautious in considering Area C and EJ, not least because it fears that the successes achieved in Areas A and B would be compromised by such a shift of focus, but also because it lacks administrative and political jurisdiction. Donors, notably the EU, have invested in development initiatives in EJ since 2007 and a multi-donor mechanism to address humanitarian needs in Palestine has been in place for many years[38] through INGOs, LNGOs and CBOs. Coordination of interventions, however, has not always been optimum, sectoral spread has been fragmented (limited), and lack of clear national plans – which can become rapidly outdated in such volatile operating environments – have hampered effectiveness. In addition, donors and UN agencies were -and still are- themselves cautious about a more collective approach to work in Area C and EJ, partly because it blurred the boundaries and mandates between humanitarian and development actors, but also because of the implications on funding for their ongoing programs there. Although the PA has made attempts to improve aid coordination overall, donors have not always responded positively to these efforts.

The CRDP mechanism was developed in an attempt to address all these issues so that the critical transition from humanitarian to development assistance with these communities could be effected by much larger, sectorally and geographically integrated investments, whose risks could be managed with the weight and expertise of the international community (UNDP), led by the PA (MOPAD), and funded by donors, whose stake in the process of reclaiming the resources of Area C was vital to both long term economic growth[39] and their vision of a two state solution, and could provide effective management and cost effective reporting for donors. As government structures in the areas were either non-existent or institutionally weak, the mechanism would draw on the implementation expertise INGOs/CBOS. It was envisaged that OCHA would provide the overall context, and a community assessment would be undertaken to provide the baseline indicators.

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[38] Humanitarian assistance was primarily channeled through the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) managed by the UN, OCHA, INGOs and the UN clusters who identified the humanitarian needs of communities in Area C, EJ and Gaza. Projects funded through CAP were implemented primarily through INGOs and LNGOs who partnered with CBOs. The CAP program was designed to target most urgent needs but these needs extend far beyond addressing humanitarian vulnerabilities.

[39] Calculations done by the UNDP and later published by the World Bank estimate potential revenue from Area C activities of $3.5 billion, and would create over 150,000 jobs.

Chapter IV: Evaluation Analysis

This chapter includes nine sections, sequentially analyzing: the program objectives; the program outputs; the implementation modalities; the institutional implementation arrangements; the funding and financial management; gender; knowledge generation; impacts, risks, and sustainability; and harmonization and alignment. Each section starts with a summary of what was stated/envisaged in the program document, and then provides the evaluation questions and the evaluation results.

Section 1 - Program Objectives and Design

In order to understand the project design, the Evaluation Team tried to rebuild the logical framework (using the standard sets of questions presented in Annex), from goal to each specific objective. This was implied exploring the understanding amongst program institutions and implementers of the definition of stakeholders, resilience, and sustainable development; checking the assumptions to achieve the goals and objectives; clarifying how activities were correlated to a certain objective; and assessing gaps in monitoring indicators, in particular of the number of communities, people, institutions, to benefit from the program.

1.1 Initial Program Objectives.

The CRDP was designed to meet the overall objective (outcome) " to empower local stakeholders in Area C and East Jerusalem, through the most appropriate partners (LNGOs, INGOs), to act with resilience to respond to threats that affect their sustenance on the land", with three specific objectives:

i)   Prevent the erosion of living conditions of Palestinians in Area C and East Jerusalem that undermines their development capital;

ii)   Protect Palestinian land and property in Area C and East Jerusalem; and

iii)   Mitigate and ideally reverse the migration flow from Area C and East Jerusalem by enhancing human security and the livelihood of Palestinians.

In addition, as explained earlier (Chapter 1- Historical Background), Sweden and UNDP (in the context of their bilateral agreement) pursued two objectives: (a) to put the Palestinian government in the lead for the development of Area C and East Jerusalem and overcome the restrictions imposed by the Israeli occupation and the Oslo Accords; and (b) to switch from humanitarian to development aid and enable the pooling of resources and the synergy between the two types of assistance

1.1.1   Evaluation Questions

Three main questions were addressed by the Midterm Evaluation:

- Were the program objectives relevant in the political and socio-economic context of 2009-2012?
- Are they still relevant today for the remainder of the program (2014-2015)?
- Should they be kept as such for the continuation of the program beyond 2015?

1.1.2   Evaluation Analysis

In the context of both the PA's and donors' commitment to the two-state solution, it is clear that the CRDP's global and specific objectives are fully legitimate.

Stakeholders. A narrow interpretation, of who the stakeholders are, supported by the three sub-goals, is "the Palestinian people" living in Area C and EJ. However, looking at the way the project proposals deal with the issue of local stakeholders/partners, and confirmed by field visits, it is clear that "local stakeholders" and "partners" are often interpreted to mean the same thing in terms of achieving the program goals. "Partners" are seen as a comprehensive and multi layered grouping involving individuals, families, structured communities with elders, state and non-state actors at local level, such as CBOs, municipal councils, LGUs, Governors, and possibly local representations of relevant ministries. For example, the LNGO, Al Mawrid went to the Ministry of Education at national and directorate level to inform them of their needs assessment for remedial teachers; ACTED went to the Bethlehem Governor during the project design phase to ensure his support as needed; ACTED also worked with community committees in refugee camps and PHG involved community and CBO representatives in the selection of water cisterns to be rehabilitated; PHG also worked with the Land Research Center to help identify priority areas, and beneficiaries.

When is a "partner" also a "stakeholder"? The "Assessment"[40], which according to the PD was due to provide a mapping of stakeholders, listed four categories in Area C: United Nations agencies; International and national NGOs; Donors; and Government bodies[41].However, the population is not listed! The experience on the ground is that both the population and all partners listed above are also stakeholders. Israeli institutions such as ICA and COGAT are not considered stakeholders by the PMU, with whom this was discussed. This is rather surprising since ICA and COGAT basically determine the living conditions and sources of livelihoods for the Palestinians living in Area C and East Jerusalem[42]. This conceptual separation in the PD makes it more difficult to see what a more effective strategy would be appropriate to address resilience of "local stakeholders".

Specific objectives I and II. Preserving or restoring the assets and services needed to build up the resilience (as defined in Chapter 2) of Palestinians living in Areas C and East Jerusalem is indeed fundamental to:

(a) The preservation of the Palestinian community and culture, including the sense of identity with the Palestinian State of communities left aside for over 20 years;

(b) Provide living conditions in accordance to human rights principles; and

(c) Laying the conditions for economic growth and sustainable development.

These objectives are still relevant today and will remain relevant beyond 2015, as long as there is a genuine commitment to the two-state solution.

Specific objective III. The legitimacy of objective III is more difficult to assess. The history of migrations shows that people decide to migrate within a country or out of a country for any number of reasons, and families and communities manage migration decisions in many different ways,

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[40] Birzeit University/ MOPAD/UNDP (2013): Assessment of the Current Situation and of the Development Priorities of 100 Communities in Area C.
[41]Idem. P. 34
[42]This question has been debated at a workshop in the context of the preparation of UNDAF. The conclusion had been that critical Israeli institutions should be considered as stakeholders.

regardless of what state decision-makers provide as incentives either to migrate or to stay on the land[43]. It is clear that this is a particularly sensitive issue for Area C and East Jerusalem as the Palestinian population in Area C and East Jerusalem is confronted to the migration policy of Israel that provides incentives for populating new settlements, while the PA has limited means to enable the Palestinian population to live decently and productively in these areas. The question is, therefore, whether the scope and nature of CRDP's project interventions sufficient to compete with Israel's settlement policies. This question will be addressed in the next section on program design.

Objective of fostering PA's leadership over Area C and EJ. The Evaluation also found that Sweden's/UNDP objectives of enabling the PA to take charge of Area C and EJ, and evolving from humanitarian to development aid are fully warranted. Sustainable development is indeed not possible unless a national political and administrative structure takes charge of leading such development. Leading such development is not the role of donors. By definition, sustainable development suggests that donor assistance should eventually be phased out. However, the question remains whether the CRDP design was adequate to enable the PA to take charge of fostering sustainable development of Area C and EJ, both at the macro-and micro levels. This question will also be addressed in the section on institutional arrangements.

1.2 Initial Program Design

The CRDP was designed using the logical framework approach. As a result, the PD suggested four outputs for the program in order to achieve the stated objectives:

> **Output 1:** Public and social infrastructure in Area C and EJRM improved
>
> **Output 2:** Improved access to and protection of natural resources
>
> **Output 3:** Economic opportunities enhanced through support to livelihoods in Area C and EJRM
>
> **Output 4:** Rights of Palestinian citizens in Area C and EJRM are upheld through legal protection, advocacy and community participation and mobilization

1.2.1 Evaluation questions:

- Were the four outputs rightly chosen to reach the objectives?
- What assumptions were made to support the choice of these outputs?
- Are there any gaps?
- Was the program scale sufficient to achieve the objectives?

1.2.2 Evaluation

Design of outputs. Firstly, it is to be noted that the four outputs were formulated as outcomes rather than outputs. This is only important insofar as it creates confusion as to what the program is

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[43] PCBS/MOPAD/UNFAP. 2010. A reading in the results of Opt migration survey 2010. http://www.mopad.pna.ps/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=227:during-a-study-conducted-by-mopad-and-pcbs-133-of-palestinians-desire-to-migrate-and-67-of-the-palestinian-households-has-one-immigrant-at-least&catid=16:mop-news&Itemid=151. See also the study by Kennan J. and Walker R.: Modeling Individual Migration Decisions, Department of Economics, University of Wisconsin, March 2012. http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~jkennan/research/MigIzaR2.pdf

expected to deliver. As an illustration, the correct formulation for output 1 should have been 'Rehabilitation of public and social infrastructure', for output three: 'Access to and protection of natural resources'. "Improved" infrastructure and access to water and soil erosion arrested, would be the outcomes. The monitoring indicators (and impacts) would be the time saved on transport, the incremental volume of water available for irrigation or watering the animals, and the incremental area of productive land available for cultivation.

Secondly, the content of each output is unconventional, at least in reference to development experience, and does not sufficiently establish a solid correlation between outputs and program objectives[44].

(i) **Output 1**. This output covers 'public and social' infrastructure. Looking at the details in the PD, what is meant by public infrastructure is essentially roads and energy, and social infrastructure is health clinics, schools, and housing. Looking at the project descriptions, road rehabilitation is correctly classified as 'public' infrastructure, whether these are intra-Area C roads or roads connecting assets in Area C with Areas A and B. The provision of off-grid electricity is more debatable: if it were grid electricity provided as a public service, users would pay a connection and a service fee. Off-grid solutions such as Solar Home Systems (SHS) are normally considered 'private goods' unless they are part of a fee-for-service arrangement. In the CRDP, they are provided as grants to individual families and therefore become private goods. Likewise for housing; whatever help or subsidies might be provided by the CRDP, housing then becomes a private good. The content of health and education projects financed by the CRDP actually highlight that, in line with the lessons learned from international development experience, education services provided in those projects: teachers training, remedial education, technical education etc. is equally if not more important than the physical infrastructure component (buildings and equipment) to achieve the goal of building the resilience of Palestinians.

(ii) **Output 2**.The content of this output is basically the provision of water and sanitation services, environmental and cultural heritage. Granted that in the case of Palestine, the issue of water is a question of access to, and protection of, natural resources, the provision of water and sanitation infrastructure and related services are normally considered 'public' services. The merit of considering such services as part of infrastructure is that there often are synergies between infrastructure services, in particular between energy, water, and sanitation. By contrast, land reclamation is not considered by CRDP linked to natural resources, while reforestation is. Land management whether through reforestation, development through irrigation (in whatever form), and protection (e.g., with fencing) is normally associated with the protection and development of natural resources, to the benefit of all the population of the West Bank (those living in area C as well as those living in area A and B). Cultural heritage includes not only the natural resource capital, but also monuments, arts and literature, family and other traditions etc.; the preservation of cultural heritage

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[44]The Evaluation could not verify whether these groupings are correlated to the UN/donor clusters.

resources could have been part of the development of livelihoods and employment through tourism.

(iii) **Output 3.** This output is the most clearly defined, with emphasis on the development of agriculture and animal husbandry for the rural or peri-urban lands, and suggestions of alternative sources of employment, and businesses and job creation. However, no connection is established in the PD between the potential business/employment opportunities sought after in output 3 which could arise from Output 1 and 2 in particular.

(iv) **Output 4.** This output is extremely important. However, it seems to have been designed as an 'independent output' instead of a 'support service' output for the first three. Legal assistance and community organization are necessary to execute any of the first three outputs. Field visits in fact revealed that it was left to the individual implementer to manage community, capacity building, and legal issues which arose during implementation.

Gaps. Using the logical framework approach, the Evaluation reflected on the assumptions which would be necessary to achieve the overall goal of the program as well as the strategic objectives, as summarized below:

Table (1): Summary of the overall goal of the program as well as the strategic objectives

Goal/Objective	Assumptions	Are the present outputs likely to fulfill the assumptions (or resolve the prevailing constraints)?
Goal: to empower local stakeholders/partners in Area C and East Jerusalem to act with resilience to respond to threats that affect their sustenance on the land Objectives: 1. Prevent the erosion of living conditions 2. Protect Palestinian land and property 3. Mitigate or reverse migration flow through improved security and livelihoods	Do Palestinians have legal rights to their land, natural resources, and housing?	Some projects have given Palestinians legal tenure on land and housing, but this has not been a systematic expected outcome of the program
	Can Palestinians obtain a sufficient income from their land, jobs and businesses in order to stay in or move back to area C and EJ?	In all projects, beneficiaries have other sources of income than the primary economic activity targeted by the project, including working on Israeli settlements
	Do Palestinians have the technical knowledge and skills to exploit the land, natural resources, and manage/create businesses?	Most of the projects included skill building or technical training but this was not a systematic expected outcome in the project design

	Do communities, local public or private institutions have the capacity to protect/defend the rights and safety of the population?	Limited capacity building of implementers provided under the program; no capacity building of LGUs or other public organization provided, support of some communities but not systematically for each output; no provision to improve the safety of the populations

This analysis helped identify several gaps in program outputs, which can be grouped into two major categories: First, human capital development, second institutional capacity building, both being 'support outputs' to the first three.

(i) Human capital development: this should be a systematic requirement of all program activities in order to achieve successfully the program goal and objectives. **From international experience, knowledge and skills are at the heart of resilience and sustainable development.** A good illustration is the work done by Al Mawrid in education. The projects they implement address the needs of both teachers and students. They make the school principals accountable for ensuring that the teachers use their recently acquired skills; Al Mawrid also supervises the schools after the training is provided. By contrast, the Bedouins who received the SHS from Dan Church Aid are not taught how to maintain the SHS or diagnose a problem with the appliances (such as refrigerators) that are supplied as part of the grant package.

> **Need for knowledge and skills training**
> The field visit of one community revealed that one of the refrigerators had a deficient rubber seal. The women were complaining that the batteries were insufficient. They had no clue that the cold air was leaking out of the refrigerator and therefore draining the batteries for nothing! In another community, some women were fairly knowledgeable about the main elements of the electricity installation but would not know how to diagnose a malfunctioning component or make simple repairs. Their solution was to call a repair service (and they did not have the telephone number!).

Experience in many countries (including in neighboring Jordan and Egypt) has demonstrated that it is quite easy to teach both women and men in the assembly and maintenance of solar home systems. Had the project *outcome* included technical capacity building, the implementer would have had to design the project accordingly. (See Recommendation 5.2.1.3 in Chapter V: Moving Forward- Challenges and Evaluation Recommendations)

(ii) Institutional Capacity Building. Again, this should be a 'support output' for all the activities undertaken under the first three outputs, and an expansion of output 4, so that all projects would build the capacity of local communities to organize their own development program, seek and receive adequate legal services, increase the technical competencies of their CBO, and eventually mobilize their own resources. In addition, specific capacity building could be provided to LGUs so that they can become more effective "partners" of the local

populations. Capacity building at the community level is fundamental for building/rebuilding the sense of identify (cf. Al Hoash project in East Jerusalem) or paving the way for sustainable development. Capacity building is complex and time consuming but pays off in the longer-term. For example, in the World Bank-financed VNDP Project[45], the first eighteen months were spent on capacity building of LGUs. The return was very high: some communities managed to leverage the funding received through the World Bank-funded program, tripling the resources allocated. Another critical element of capacity building relates to legal issues. There should be a pool of legal resources available to all projects under the program to deal systematically with all the work suspension or demolition orders, with land or housing titles, etc. In the absence of a Palestinian police corps in Area C and EJ to face the Israeli military which protects the settlers, an effective legal corps would strengthen the 'stakeholders' resilience'.

An assessment of the current knowledge generation systems suggests a similar role for knowledge generation as an additional 'support output' for other program outputs(see below, Section 7, Knowledge Generation).

Time frame and scope of the program. The program goals and objectives are quite ambitious, especially without a clear identification, at the onset, of the proportion of communities and populations targeted by the program. Some people interviewed think that the program is targeted at the whole population of Area C and East Jerusalem. The question is therefore, whether an initial three year implementation period, and $16.71 million of resources was adequate to meet the goal, taking into account that the PA was to attract more donor funding for the CRDP

The Evaluation agrees with the reference made in the PD section on the program implementation strategy that the CRDP is a *pilot program*. The currently established three-year timeframe for program implementation as well as the level of financing are respectively too short and too limited to allow the program to meet all the needs to build the 'resilience' towards sustainable development of Area C. Furthermore, it was recognized that there would be a lot of learning by doing, at least in the mind of the Swedish donor, given the CRDP historical background and the decision to get the program going even before having completed the Assessment. **The CRDP success should therefore be assessed against the concept of *pilot phase* rather than that of a full-fledged program.** This said, the current phase of the program was not really designed as a pilot phase, with clearly identified content of institutional elements to be tested.

Linkages with communities and institutions in Area's B and A

During field visits, it became apparent that the land of Area C was primarily owned by adjacent communities living in Area's B and A, who have a clear stake in the outcomes of the programme. In some cases, for example the PHG project to rehabilitate agricultural rain water collection cisterns on the Eastern slopes, farmers (sharecroppers and owners) working on the land in Area C were residents of Beit Furik. The Beit Furik municipality was thoroughly invested in the project through its membership in the project committee along with local CBOs. The municipality takes a very proactive approach to the protection of the land, with a budget line which can be used to cover the costs of mobilization for demonstrations against Israeli threats, small shopkeepers in the Beit Furik

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[45] The Village and Neighborhood Development Project implemented 2008-2012 with 10.5 million dollars of funding

community make contributions to cover the costs of refreshments for these events, and all demolition orders are managed by the municipality. The MOA has also invested significant resources in the land in the form of extensive tree planting on the hills bounding the valley, the MOE supplies two teachers to manage a school on the land, which has been demolished twice and rebuilt.

In other areas, the linkages between the farmers/herders and local representative bodies are very weak. At another project site (Tel Al Khashaba) under the same PHG project, despite increased access to water for their flocks, and reduced water tinkering costs through the rehabilitation of an agricultural road, the farmers we talked to are extremely despondent. They feel and look extremely vulnerable and desperate about their situation. Their livelihoods are under daily threat and they are not at all optimistic about the future. There seems to be little support from their local councils (beyond tents) for their situation. Bedouin communities in particular, feel that there is no-one to represent them and when in trouble, they seek support from their tribal chiefs but are unable to avert destructions and forced re-location. This suggests that the connectedness of Area C communities with national and local institutions at the local level in Areas B and A can be a great driver of sustainable outcomes for investments in Area C because of the mutuality of interests involved. Where connectedness is weak – or absent- the sustainability of the outcomes are greatly at risk as people feel tremendously vulnerable.

By conceptualizing work in Area C as an integral part of work in Area B and A, CRDP will overcome the trend of isolating and fragmenting communities by inclusion and integration.

1.3 **Recommendations**

As there is only one year left and US$ 4,606,398 million of uncommitted funds to complete the current phase of the CRDP, it is late to do a substantial redesign of the program outputs and outcomes. However, given the 'pilot' nature of the program, there is room to consider the following recommendations, which would strengthen the program, both for the remaining year of implementation and certainly for the continuation of the program.

- The CRDP (ST, RB and PMU and a sample or all implementers and of the participating populations) should undertake a thorough stakeholder mapping. The results of such mapping could be used to focus the next call for proposal, and possibly test new institutional arrangements, in particular to deal with legal and capacity building issues.
- The outputs should be redefined along the following themes: infrastructure (transport, energy, water and sanitation), social services and human development, productive assets rehabilitation, income generation and livelihoods (including business development), institutional capacity building.
- Regardless of the technical/output focus, project proponents should be requested to systematically include human capital development (knowledge transfer, skill building) and institutional capacity building components in their projects.
- Proponents should also be requested to explain how the sustainability of their project will be addressed during implementation, so that activities don't stop once the CRDP funding is exhausted.
- With the remainder of the uncommitted funds (or part thereof), the CRDP could consider doing a full-fledged 'pilot' project. This is detailed Chapter V.

- CRDP should include the parameter of connectedness of project beneficiaries to communities and institutions in Areas B and A under its sustainability framework and ask implementing partners to explain how they will address this as part of their project design.

Section 2 - Implementation Modalities

2.1 Calls for Proposals

The CRDP has managed 3 calls for proposals over the program period in November 2012, October 2013 and May 2013, generating a total of 305 proposals of which 52(17%) have been approved.[46]

Table (2): Results of the Calls for Proposals

Call for Proposals	Round 1	Round 2	Round 3	TOTAL
1. No. of Projects submitted	162	41	102	305
2. No. of Projects Selected (% of 2/1)	20 (12.3%)	10 (24.4%)	19 (21.6%)	49(16%)
3. US$ Amount of funding requested	29,028,850	5,170,682	10,853,130	45,052,266
4. US$ Amount of funding committed (% of 4/3)	4,171,102 (14.4%)	1,364,919 (26.3%)	5,216,695 (48%)	10,744,716 (23.8%)

The first round was an open call covering all themes and all program areas. The second – and to a greater extent – the third round calls were more targeted with an increasing geographical and thematic focus linked to the findings of the needs assessment[47] and PA Ministries'[48] input and guidance based on the most recent Palestinian National Development Plan (PNDP)[49] and the Strategic Multi-sector Development Plan (SMDP) for East Jerusalem. Since the start of the CRDP implementation in September 2012, the calls for proposals have evolved in terms of implementing partners targeted, funding thresholds and project duration. The third call for proposals targeted local NGOs (LNGO), International NGOs (INGOs), Community Based Organizations (CBOs) and Local Government Units (LGUs) that were based entirely in Area C. In the third round, the call for proposals (CFP) provided a funding threshold of US$500,000, and increased project duration to 8 months. In comparison, the first and second rounds only targeted LNGOs and international INGOs,

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[46] These figures are based on actuals.
[47] UNDP, MOPAD, Birzeit Center for Continuing Education. (2013) "FINAL REPORT: Assessment of the Current Situation and of the Development Priorities of 100 Communities in Area C" Community Resilience and Development Programme for Area C and East Jerusalem (CRDP) report
[48] MOLG, MOJA, MOA. MOLG speaks for the MOH and MOE on health and education priorities.
[49] The PNDP 2014-2016 is supported by sector plans elaborated by each ministry.

with project durations of 12 months and funding thresholds of US$250,000 and US$150,000 respectively. Evaluation criteria for proposals were the same for all three CFPs.[50]

2.2 **CRDP project portfolio**

The CRDP project portfolio is almost equally divided between Area C and EJ[51] in terms of project numbers but Area C has received almost twice the budget due to differences in areas of thematic focus and resulting project scope and size there.

CRDP project distribution by main geographical focus

main geographical focus	
Jerusalem Governorate	25
Area C	24

CRDP project budget allocations by main geographical areas
(all figures in US Dollars)

Budget allocation	
Area C	6,736,945
Jerusalem Governorate	3,873,787

Within Area C, there is a concentration of projects in the inner hills, mainly in South Hebron but also in Bethlehem governorate. The least area of geographical focus is the seam zone.

CRDP project distribution by Area C sub locations

sub location Area C	
inner hills	15
north of eastern slopes	5.5
jordan valley	2.5
seam zone	1

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
[50] For additional details see Annex V, *Comparison of all Calls for Proposals*
[51] The PD provides the definition of geographical areas into EJ and Area C. Jerusalem Governorate is used here as a more comprehensive designation which includes all parts of East Jerusalem.

Thematically, output 1 has the greatest focus with over half the projects and just under half the project budgets. Table 3 below illustrates the full thematic picture of the CRDP portfolio.

Table (3):The full thematic picture of the CRDP portfolio.

Thematic focus	Output 1	Output 2	Output 3	Output 4	Total
Number of projects	25	13	5.5	5.5	**49**
Numbers of projects as % of total	51%	27%	11%	11%	**100%**
Budget in dollars	5,053,944	3,419,696	1,420,469	715,723	**10,609,832**
Budget as % of total project budget	48%	31%	13%	7%	**100%**

Implementing partners are predominantly LNGOS but village councils now have a 10% share of all projects.

CRDP Projects by implementing partner

Projects target three main demographic groups – the community, farmers and herders, and Bedouins with a lesser focus on women, youth, disabled and children. A number of projects have allocated budgets for gender-focused activities with women, and separate youth-focused components (see Section 6, Gender)

2.3. Contractual arrangements with implementing entities

All contractual arrangements with implementing entities are managed through a standard UNDP Micro capital grant agreement delineating partner management and reporting responsibilities. Project funding is disbursed in two or three tranches. The project itself is divided into two phases.[52] This has discouraged some implementing partners to apply for the subsequent rounds of calls for proposals. However, it is to be recognized that the CRDP management unit took into account some of these concerns in the third call for proposals by removing the requirement for two phases, and they are still exploring with UNDP how to design a system which meets both UNDP standard accountability and tranching procedures and the CRDP need for flexible mechanisms.

2.4. Monitoring & evaluation and reporting processes

Grantees are required to develop project-level log frames, indicators, targets and baseline data against which they measure and report their progress towards objectives.

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[52] The system of dividing project activities into two distinct phases was discontinued after the first round.

2.5 Evaluation questions

Two evaluation questions are addressed below:

    (i)   Were the implementation modalities relevant, efficient?

    (ii)   Has the call for proposals been effective in enabling the CRDP to generate to generate a critical mass of outcomes?

2.6 Evaluation analysis

2.6.1. Call for proposals

Since the needs assessment commissioned by UNDP to Birzeit University took longer than planned, the first "totally open" call for proposals was expedient to get things going. The Program Document (PD) had been 8 months in preparation

> "Communities are in dire need of many things to form a basis for development. Small and isolated CRDP actions are not that effective. They need comprehensive and extensive support to become self-sufficient. They need a long term project, not small and isolated actions."
> *Focus Group participants, West Bank, EJ*

despite funding already being committed. However, the open call led to a thematic fragmentation and a geographical dispersion of efforts, to the point that no critical mass of experience/institutional capacity was created. The feedback process enabled the CRDP management team/Steering committee to realize that lack of thematic and geographical targeting led to fragmentation without creating a critical mass of results – be they physical infrastructure, economic solutions, or human capital, institutional and empowerment capacities - and might jeopardize the achievement of program objectives. The geographical targeting of the second call corrected the imbalance towards EJ, but did not correct the imbalance between thematic areas. **The third call was intended to provide additional geographical and thematic focus.** The additional emphasis on the Inner Hills[53] was achieved with a range of sectoral needs addressed in some communities[54], and thematic interventions in a group of nearby geographical locations were featured in several proposals, and areas of East Jerusalem aligned with their specific needs were better defined. However, opportunities were missed for additional multi-sectoral community focus and clustering of projects in other areas. In addition, two repeat implementing partners (ARIJ and Dan church aid) proposed repeat project models which had demonstrated either very limited sustainability (see Annex 7) or were not considered the highest priority projects by the beneficiaries involved in the previous project.[55]

2.6.2 Contracting and tranching arrangements

The contractual, tranching arrangements, and UNDP regulations and procedures reflect commitment to rigor and transparency. However, for the **CRDP context where flexibility is of essence, they are overly bureaucratic, quite time consuming, not always clear, and do not meet the need for CRDP to be a mechanism that can respond quickly and efficiently to the**

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[53] Area C was divided into 4 geographical sub divisions: Inner Hills (Bethlehem and Hebron governorates); Eastern Slopes (Nablus and Tubas governorates); Jordan Valley including Jericho; and the Seam Zone. East Jerusalem was divided into 4 sub divisions: Jerusalem Governorate; East Jerusalem (inside the wall); area E1 in Jerusalem Governorate; and North west of Jerusalem Governorate.

[54]Dakaika[housing, disabled], Ma'an Development Center, Continuing Education and Community Service Center; Um Bweib [sanitation, mobile library], ARIJ, Continuing Education and Community Service Center.

[55] Evaluation notes made by CRDP during focus group with project beneficiaries.

specific exigencies of Area C and EJ programming requirements[56]. A strong consensus exists among implementing partners that, although the administrative requirements were fairly standard, more procedural clarity and flexibility was required as the project duration (12 months) was too short to both navigate the requirements and do a sufficient amount of activities to create both impact and sustainability. The CRDP was set up to respond to immediate needs and engage in fairly short- term interventions; implementation procedures need to be correspondingly flexible (see comments in box below from implementing partners from the two focus group discussion with EJ and Area C implementing partners).

Implementation issues as related by implementing partners We asked for project extensions due to confiscations and difficulties in doing work during snow in the winter but it was declined…. dividing such a small project into 2-phases seems unnecessary, particularly as we were asked to prepare our proposal on a one-phase approach … it takes 4 months to do the procurement, then you only have 8 months for implementation. This cannot develop sustainability…the paperwork is very onerous …some changes were made in procedures during implementation...CRDP declined to provide UN trucks to help us transport goods through checkpoints. As a result, we had to go to a Palestinian contractor, and have him buy materials from an Israeli contractor, so they can ship items directly from Israel while avoiding checkpoints. *Focus group participants, West Bank and EJ*

Based on implementing partner feedback, CRDP has modified requirements somewhat since the first round of projects: division of projects into two phases has been discontinued, but pre-set trenching remains in place, the funding threshold has been significantly raised, and different contracting modalities are being utilized. However, tranching (rather than pay-as-you-go) is still in place, a monthly calendar submission is still required, and project duration has been reduced to 8 months from 12 in the third round.[57]

2.6.3 M&E methodologies and Reporting requirements

In our analysis, we have made a conceptual separation between M&E and Knowledge Generation: activities taking place at the project level, and those taking place at the program-level. This distinction helps focus on the requirements for each level. The M&E requirements are quite data intensive with pre and post baselines mandated along with project-specific log frames and indicators. For example, the Dan church aid project for household-based electricity through provision of solar panels, electric milk churners and refrigerators had 3 outcome indicators, with base and end line data being collected through community surveys in five isolated communities spread over two governorates. These requirements offer little relevant information for accountability and decision-making in support of the overall program objectives and goals. Although the indicators do attempt to measure increases in self-reliance and empowerment at household level, they do not show how this translates into increasing the resilience of the community to stay on their land, whether the implementation approach chosen was the best possible

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[56] These include external factors which cause delays in implementation during which contractors still need to pay their workers, and a flexible understanding of the differential imperatives in Area C and EJ where support to the EJ market is an integral part of the project procurement approach.
[57] Page 11, Call for Proposals for Implementing partners, 3rd Round of funding, 26th May, 2014.

in the context, and how the exclusion of half of the families in the community from the impressive benefits of the project has impacted community cohesion.

Project level log frames and indicators are not always well aligned with CRDP outputs and outcomes. These misalignments may be attributable to how partners have phrased their outcomes, but the lack of strong linkages could also reflect a lack of shared understanding of what the project goals and objectives are and strategies proposed to achieve them. As an illustrative example, in the Action Aid project for Enhancing Community Resilience through Protection of Rights and Economic Development in the South Hebron Hills, the projects outcome indicators have weak linkages to CRDP's own outcome indicators in the Results and Resources Framework under outputs 3 and 4 as table (4) below illustrates.

Table (4): Linkages across CRDP and Implementing partner indicators

Outcome indicators Action Aid	Outcome indicators CRDP
80% of direct beneficiaries with more positive perceptions of local development opportunities, reduced concerns regarding future displacement	# of Palestinians targeted by DRDP who stay in Area C/EJRM lands (disaggregated by sex and age)
70% of local authorities, I/NGOs and donors active in project areas with enhanced awareness of community profiles	Land reclaimed, rehabilitated and restored for Palestinian use under the CRDP
	# of population benefitting and expressing satisfaction from social and public infrastructure built with the support of CRDP (users disaggregated by sex and age)

Expectations of output achievements presented in the CRDP Results and Resources Framework are somewhat unrealistic as the precise content of proposals is difficult to predict with the reactive rolling calls for proposals methodology adopted, although with greater thematic and geographical focus, more realistic proactive targets could be set. At present, it is unreasonable for CRDP to be held accountable for the current targets set in the PD.

The quantitative baselines seem very onerous for a short-term project and more qualitative indicators are needed to show progress towards the achievement of resilience by the communities targeted. This may imply different results monitoring methodologies from those currently used. **Implementing partners were not aware of lessons learned from other projects, nor that they knowledge could be of help to replicate similar efforts.**

2.6.4 Effectiveness of Implementation Modalities on Outcomes

In spite of efforts made from the initial through the third call for proposals to provide guidance to proponents on geographical and thematic focus, the 'call for proposals' modality has generated a somewhat fragmented and unbalanced portfolio in terms of resource allocation, geographically and

thematically (outputs). Over half of the resources have been allocated to infrastructure (output 1), over a fourth to natural resources (output 2), and over 10% each for output 3 and 4. The only information on outcomes available at this point is contained in the PMU quarterly and annual reports. In terms of individual project results, there are undoubtedly some very valuable results. However, it is not clear whether (a) there is a synergistic (or multiplier effect) between project interventions (e.g., have improved roads led to increased land reclamation, to increased production, to increased incomes, and to an improvement in the economic situation and security of the beneficiary population?); and (b) whether the sum of results from individual projects -- even in one sector (education, health, agriculture)– is starting to create the critical mass of results which the program designers envisaged. These questions are addressed in Section 7, Knowledge Generation.

2.7   Recommendations

2.7.1   Calls for proposals

Further focus should be considered in the soliciting of CRDP proposals so that additional opportunities are enabled for both thematic and geographical concentration. This will help to optimize competitive advantages of particular geographical communities or areas in particular thematic approaches. Implementing partnerships could be mandated across thematic areas so that a critical mass of projects can be realized in one or more adjacent communities. In addition, a pre-qualification process, which identifies competent implementing partners with comparative advantages in thematic and geographical areas, should be undertaken to streamline proposal evaluation and approval processes.

2.7.2   Contracting and trenching arrangements

More flexible contracting and trenching arrangements should be considered to enable implementing partners to concentrate their resources on project monitoring while still allowing for reasonable, and warranted, levels of fiscal accountability. The trenching of projects into phases should be discontinued and reimbursements should be made on an as-needed basis through requests from the implementing partner. Those partners with weaker institutional strengths should be supported through the PMU with capacity development assistance and receive more frequent spot checks of their financial and record keeping systems.

2.7.3   M&E methodologies and reporting requirements

CRDP should consider restructuring M&E requirements at the project and program level towards knowledge generation and decision-making which can provide evidence on emerging outcomes which contribute to resilience at the individual, community and Area C/EJ levels which can inform on-going programming and replicability potential. In particular CRDP should:

- Review the current outcome indicators in the CRDP Results and Resource Framework (RRF) to ensure that the evidence generated by project activities can support the achievement of program goals and objectives. While project-level output indicators are adequate for technical and fiscal accountability, project-level outcome indicators should be streamlined and focused on more qualitative data around perceptions of positive additional development opportunities (incomes, infrastructure and social services, land and housing titles), reduced concerns of further displacement, and extent of linkages and active

cooperation with: other Area C and EJ communities; other local stakeholders including local authorities, local level PA ministries, governors, community committees, LNGOs; and international entities which can confer protection, support , expertise and solidarity.

- Share the CRDP RRF with implementing partners as part of the call for proposals package so that project-level log frame development can be facilitated.

Section 3 - Institutional Implementation Arrangements

3.1   Initial Implementation arrangements

The structure of implementation arrangements for the CRDP is quite standard:

- A steering committee (SC) comprising senior MOPAD, UNDP, and donor representatives to provide policy guidance and accountability to the PA and donors;
- A Review Board (RB) composed of representatives also of MOPAD, UNDP and donors to decide on the project proposals and exercise oversight for the day to day implementation of the program;
- A Project Management Unit (PMU) located in Ramallah to manage the program. Implementers (INGOs, LNGOs, CBOs, and LGUs for the third call) selected through pre-qualifications and the project proposal process. MOPAD and UNDP are the co-chairs of the RB. MOPAD was to coordinate with other PA ministries.
- Technical support from UNDP/PAPP staff to complement the competencies of the PMU, in particular for the assessment of proposals and supervision of projects.

After the first two calls for proposals, three ministries jointed the Steering Committee and Review Board: the Ministries of Local Government (MOLG), the Ministry of East Jerusalem Affairs (MOJA), and the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA)

MOPAD

3.2   Evaluation Questions

- Have the implementation arrangements been relevant, efficient and effective to achieve the program objectives.
- Do they contribute to empowering the PA government to take charge of Area C & EJ and defend the interests of the population [in the negotiations with Israel]?
- Are the implementation arrangements adequate to manage risks?

3.3   Evaluation Analysis

3.3.1 Relevance, Efficiency, and Effectiveness of the CRDP institutional structure.

Implementation Structure. The structure of the initial implementation arrangements is straightforward, and may have made sense when the CRDP was set up in 2012. The recent inclusion of 3 more ministries on the Steering Committee and Review Board is a positive step given the need to involve local government structures to support project execution, resolve issues and potentially take charge of development programs. The participation of the MOJA is also important

given the specificity of issues in the Jerusalem Governorate as well as their long experience in dealing with the Israeli occupation.

Whether both a steering committee and a review board are necessary for such a small project and when budgets and human resources are limited is debatable. But perhaps more importantly, there seems to be some blurring of the boundaries between the functions of the SC and the RB because here seems to be some overlap in membership of these two bodies: many of the same institutions and/or people seem to have been appointed to serve on both the SC and the RB. As a result, the policy and accountability function of the SC seems to have been made redundant by having the same people serve on the RB. The Steering Committee has barely met or played much of a role. The RB has played its role adequately, as evidenced by the minutes of the various meetings, although some members believe that the meetings could be managed more efficiently if (a) the quality of the documentation were improved and timely distributed prior to meetings; and (b) participants would read the material and prepare better prior to the meetings.

With respect to the co-chairmanship between MOPAD and UNDP, there is no particular merit to this arrangement for a program like CRDP, especially when the objective is to have the PA lead the development of Area C and EJ, including the coordination with other ministries and with donors.

A simpler (flatter) management structure could have been envisaged, whereby the PMU would directly report to MOPAD and UNDP would laterally provide administrative and technical support to the PMU. Hierarchical structures naturally lead to bureaucratic procedures and delays in decision-making and diffusion of accountability. The evaluation team recognizes that because of the unique operating context where the PA has no jurisdiction over Area C or EJ, there may be need for an intermediary body like UNDP to act as the unofficial arm of the PA. In addition, the resources available to MOPAD to lead the CRDP process may be inadequate. However, donors and stakeholders concur that Palestinians should own and lead the CRDP process, and that the institutional arrangements should permit the effective accountability of CRDP to donors and to the PA (by delegation to MOPAD).

3.3.2   Efficiency and effectiveness of the PMU.

Implementers, who are first in line in interacting with the PMU have all recognized that the PMU staff is competent, dedicated, and pleasant to deal with. Implementers also recognized that the PMU did not have the discretion to change the UNDP procedures. There was undoubtedly a steep learning curve for the team to become fluent with the UNDP procedures, and the recruitment process had taken time. The effort made to develop an operational manual (OM) is commendable and reflects deontological concerns for rigor and accountability. The OM is nevertheless a daunting piece that leaves little flexibility to the PMU to respond quickly to the specific situations that arise. As discussed in Section 2, the procurement and financial management procedures are particularly rigid and ill-adapted to the project needs. More timely procedural training is one area where implementers would like to see some improvements. In some cases, the promised training (e.g. on financial management) has not been delivered, with the results that some implementers reached out to other implementers to get the information. Another request is for less bureaucratic and paper work demands which take precious time away from field work; for example, the PMU requests to receive the monthly work program calendar of the implementers.

The relationship between the PMU and the implementers may need to be rethought. According to the PD, the PMU was to do an assessment of potential implementers through a pre-qualification process. There is no evidence that this has been done.

A last observation relates to the balance between administrative management versus engaging in a development dialogue/support with the implementers. Development work requires substantial field visits in order to understand the issues, help resolve them as they emerge, learn lessons from experience, and integrate those lessons for the next steps. This is an area where the PMU team may consider, by analyzing quickly the use of their time, and the share and the impact of effective field work over time[58]. For example, after six months on the job, the M&E expert had not yet had the opportunity to visit (let alone map out) all the projects. This should have been a work program priority.

3.3.3   Implementation Support Services from UNDP/PAPP.

The PD delineates the implementation responsibilities of UNDP separate from the PMU responsibilities. UNDP provides support to PMU through thematic focal points in UNDP covering gender, youth, environment and governance. The UNDP designated project officer supports the CRDP monitoring process through conductance of evaluation missions to projects. The Operational Manual further specifies UNDP's role in quality assurance, which includes "oversight activities, such as periodic monitoring visits and 'spot-checks'".[59]   A Quality Assurance framework details the criteria, method and dates of assessment. [60]In addition, the PMU does a self-assessment through an Annual Program Report (APR)that evaluates CRDP performance in contributing to the intended outcomes through the outputs. This APR is intended to inform the RB and the SC and promote dialogue with partners.[61]

Although quality control was stressed by CRDP team and evidenced, for example, through a review of e-mail exchanges on project monitoring, documented evidence of a quality assurance system in place in the sense of planned and systematic technical support activities which would ensure that quality requirements for project design, implementation and results would be met were not found. Although this was implicit in the description of the management roles and responsibilities described in the OM, the evaluation team did not get a clear sense of how this operated.

The CRDP APR of Year one stressed that "increasing coordination with other UNDP programs would provide the PMU with enhanced planning and use of resources." UNDP management recognizes that the CRDP does have some knowledge gaps (e.g. how to avoid doing liquidation reports) and Sweden in particular has expressed concern that the level of ISS support should be much stronger. Other than training on procedures, it is not clear how much support the PMU has received from the UNDP/PAPP technical staff, such as education or health specialists, infrastructure, gender or agriculture specialists. Nothing in the reporting to date shows how the support has been operationalized.

3.3.4 Implementers

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[58] One focus group complained that the PMU staff did not have time for field visits because of their focus on discussing bureaucratic matters with partners
[59] Ibid
[60] CRDP Program Document, page 34
[61] Ibid.

Almost fifty (49 to be exact) partners have been involved with the implementation of the CRDP, with varying degrees of experience and competencies. This is a large number of partners for a small program, and partially explains the administrative burden for the PMU (contracts, disbursements, reporting etc.). The value-added of such a large number of partners is questionable for the following reasons:

- Competencies: not all partners, including international partners, have the needed competencies or experience, to deliver services in Area C and EJ. Even some of the well-established NGOs do not seem up-to-date with regional or international experience. For example, an alternative to importing SHS through vendors would be to create local enterprises to assemble solar kits. This creates skills, employment
  Competition with an emerging private sector: in most countries, private companies (technology groups, consulting firms etc.) do the kind of work that is done by NGOs in Area C and EJ. Since the CRDP is concerned with livelihoods and therefore employment and business creation, could there be an opportunity to develop such businesses instead of going through the non-government sector?
- **Comparative advantage of the CRDP: for many of the implementers, in particular well-established INGOs and LNGOs, the CRDP is a source of funds among many. They were doing the same sort of work before CRDP and will continue to do the same type of work after CRDP. What therefore is the incremental contribution of the CRDP?**
- CBOs and LGUs: these were potentially where the CRDP could make the difference, provided that the CRDP would invest in capacity building. This has not yet taken place. As a result, LGUs have not fared well in the third call for proposals. The Evaluation interaction with one of the CBOs suggested that they did good work as long as the project money was available, but that they did not have the capacity to continue on their own.
- Knowledge sharing amongst implementers is weak: there have been very few opportunities for implementers to get together, share experience, and increase their technical knowledge from the experience of others.

3.3.5 Risk Management Process

In spite of the fact that the PD of the CRDP had a very detailed risk management plan, there was not a good risk management structure set in place neither to deal with project-level urgent situations nor to initiate a process amongst donors and with the Israeli occupation which would provide the Palestinians of Area C and EJ the security and safety needed for sustainable development. If the benchmark for program risk is that the CRDP equipped the PA government to lead development activities in Area C and EJ, then the program risks are high, and CRDP has not achieved much to offset this risk. Project risks have been significant but to some extent better managed

- At the project level, beneficiaries and implementers handled the first level to risks on their own such as stop-work orders or demolitions. Some implementers managed to mobilize local political authorities such as the governors to intervene in their favor. Other implementers had to adopt several strategies including liaising with the Israeli police and involving their legal advisor. In one case in the Seam Zone, the project implemented

contacted its embassy as no help was forthcoming from the PMU or UNDP or MOPAD, and then the embassy and UNDP jointly approached ICA.

- Area C projects had 4 actual incidents – associated with Israeli army demolitions of land rehabilitation works, confiscation of equipment or settler harassment - while implementers in EJ had 2 – associated with increased levels of insecurity following the murder of a Palestinian youth by settlers in EJ.
- Tools designed for identifying risks were not clearly understood by implementing partners. The risk management plans of 80% of partners conflated the risks associated with occupation-related factors with risks associated with external factors in the Palestinian social, economic and political context. Actual incidents are not logged in the CRDP M&E system or the Risk Registry. As a result, a program-level analysis of incident trends based on geographical location or thematic areas is problematic
- At program level, there is no system in place which would detail the levels of intervention and the entity responsible to provide support, in the same way as alert systems are designed – from level 1 risk, which can be solved by the implementer, level 2 to be solved by Implementer + PMU, to levels 3 or 4, to be solved by program donors (UNDP + Sweden + Austria) and level 5 to be solved by a unified and broader community of donors (e.g., UN + Quartet + EU + bilateral donors). Apparently, setting-up such a risk-alert system was discussed at European Commission level in Brussels, but the proposal was killed by some EU members.

3.3.6 Accountability for Results and Outcomes.

The current reporting system suggests three levels of accountability for program results and outcomes:

- The implementers/partners are accountable to both project beneficiaries and the PMU for delivering on their contractual obligations; some implementing partners have also mobilized local organizations to oversee the projects (e.g. Hydrology group)
- The PMU is accountable to both MOPAD and UNDP
- UNDP is accountable to the donors participating in the program.
- The bilateral donors (Sweden and Austria) are accountable to their citizens. For example, there was a major article in the Swedish press about the CRDP.

Accountability is reported in the context of contractual arrangements (contracts, exchange of letters, agreements etc.). One area which lacks accountability is the expected outcome formulated by Sweden that other donors would join the program. The UK joined the program for the first year only, and Austria joined last year, but for amounts far from matching what Sweden has contributed. Norway and Finland have expressed an interest in the program. **Meanwhile, UNDP has concluded negotiations with some donors for parallel programs. For example, it signed an agreement with Italy In November 2013 for a program called FAIR whose description reads exactly the same as the CRDP, but the PA partner is MOLG instead of MOPAD[62]. Other UN agencies are also pursuing similar programs. UNOPS, for instance, signed a livelihoods**

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[62]UNDP Press Release. November 14 2013

program for East Jerusalem which is exactly the same as the CRDP-Output 3[63]**. The Evaluation believes that both UNDP and MOPAD should, in the context of their commitment to Sweden, be accountable for mobilizing all donors, including bilateral and UN agencies, to subscribe to the CRDP.** Such a unified resource mobilization effort would increase the probability of creating the critical mass of results that are needed to support the two-state solution.

3.4. Recommendations

- Communities are aware of how to deal with the risks of implementation, but this experience needs to be informed with solid legal knowledge so that judicious strategies can be developed to confer greater protection. A legal component should be part of every project so that communities can be empowered with the knowledge needed to act.
- The consolidation and sharing of local risk management should form the response mechanism put in place (see below)
- Knowledge for learning and actionable purposes should be a key priority of CRDP knowledge generation activities.
- Documentation of actual incidents at the project level should be done as soon as they occur and entered into the risk registry so that analysis of emerging trends and lessons from mitigation strategies can inform the response mechanism put in place (see below)
- A 3-level response mechanism should be put in place (until some consensus on the 4th level is achieved with donor) so that the distribution of responsibility and the level of intervention expected are well understood.
- Modified institutional arrangements should either be considered to separate more clearly the functions of the SB and the RB so that accountability can be assured and decision-making can be expedited. A process should be agreed, whereby ownership and leadership of the CRDP process is gradually handed over to the PA and other Palestinian institutions. A diagram of the proposed institutional option compared to the current option is presented in Annex 8.

Section 4 -Funding and Financial Management

4.1 Overall Financial status of CRDP

The overall financial picture shows an uncommitted and undisbursed balance of **US$ 4,606,398** for allocation to projects and administrative costs in the 3rd year of the CRDP program. Disbursement rates are a little slow at 36%, but these should increase significantly as Round 2 projects complete. Table 5 below presents a summary of the overall financial status.

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[63]UNOPS Press Release September 15 2014

Table (5): CRDP Financial Situation (as of October 15, 2014) in US dollars

Level of funding	Funds disbursed- Projects and Administrative expenses	Funds committed to grants but undisbursed	Estimated administrative costs	Uncommitted and undisbursed balance
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(1)-(2+3+4)
16,818,015	6,117,490	5,668,269	425,858	**4,606,398**

4.2   Disbursement procedures

The average size of grants is US$ 276,431, ranging from $US56,000 to $500,000. Financial reimbursements are executed in two or three tranches aligned with activities implemented in the two phases of the project. Grants over US$150,000 are divided into two phases. Funding of the second phase is contingent upon satisfactory completion of the first phase and requires a separate agreement which has to be approved by the RB.[64] The 18% VAT on project purchases are reimbursed through the presentation by the implementing partner of a VAT certificate stamped by the Palestinian Ministry of Finance. For purchases made in EJ, there is no mechanism in place for VAT reimbursements, which can add significantly to implementing partner costs. EJ partner see support to the EJ market as a critical component of building resilience, however small.

4.3   Evaluation questions

Five evaluation questions are addressed below:

> (i)   Is the current funding sufficient to achieve the objectives?
> (ii)   What are the new prospects for the continuation of the program?
> (iii)   Is the size of the grants relevant, efficient and effective to achieve objectives?
> (iv)   Is the financial management appropriate?

4.4   Evaluation Analysis

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[64] CRDP Operational Manual, November, 2012. In practice, different types of contracting are in place and the required phasing of projects is no longer in use.

4.4.1 Funding status

Initial funding was small but remarkable on the part of Sweden in the context of risk and political uncertainty. The Swedish money up front allowed all operational costs to be secured to enable program start up. The UK provided a small amount of funds (which were all disbursed in the first year) and the Austrians are another small but significant donor, providing 15% of the overall funding commitments to date. Future donors could include Norway and Finland. Despite strong Swedish lobbying for EU members to support CRDP, Italy opted to fund a parallel but very similar mechanism managed through UNDP and led by

CRDP Funding (US$)	
SIDA	13,738,362
UK	453,172
ADA	2,476,481
UNDP	150,000
TOTAL	16,818,015

the MOLG. CRDP needs additional and very significant financial and political support of other EU donors, the EC, Canada and the World Bank to be able to create a critical mass of integrated multi sectoral interventions needed to lay the basis for long term sustainability development in Area C and EJ. CRDP projects are not large enough to achieve community-wide coverage, particularly when building social infrastructure or improving access to economic livelihoods, even within the small communities in Area C.[65] These communities need an integrated package of assistance in several sectors to lay the basis for sustainable productive activities. Without a significant injections of funds therefore, it is difficult to see how the project objectives of strengthening the resilience of Palestinian communities to sustain a productive presence on their land can be achieved.

4.4.2 Budget allocations across program functions

The original program budget detailed in the PD is distributed between grants, PMU for program management, and UNDP for General Management Support (GMS) and Implementation Support Services (ISS). Actual disbursements and commitment to date are a little different from the original allocations, with management and implementation support services now running at lower than anticipated levels as a result of lower levels of funding achieved. Table (6) below shows the original (2012) and actual budget allocations to date (2014).

Table (6): Budget Allocations

	Allocations to projects	Allocations to PMU	Allocations to GMS and ISS	
Original Budget	28,840,580	1,325,952	2,090,657	32,257,189
Percentages	89.5%	4.1%	6.4%	100%
Current budget	15,287,166	1,064,994	465,855	16,818,015
Percentage	91%	6.3%	2.8%	100%

We have been unable to get adequate clarity on what implementation support services have been provided, but we were able to ascertain that orientation of the PMU to UNDP procedures and

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[65] Projects visited included land rehabilitation, water cistern construction and provision of alternative energy resources. In all these interventions, beneficiaries were selected based on a range of criteria, but only a small percentage of community members were covered in all cases.

regulations had been undertaken[66] and one project-level cost benefit analysis had been carried out (ARIJ project for provision of household waste water management units).

4.4.3 Future funding prospects

CRDP has a small but important funding base. Attracting additional donor support is complicated by donors lack of knowledge of the context in Area C and the fact that while donors accept that the planning regime (Israelis) in Area C is illegal, donors have to be able to defend their own positions and are very reluctant to have a direct confrontation with the Israelis. Donor bilateral political agendas have – very unfortunately for future health of CRDP - permitted the creation of another program which has very similar objectives to CRDP. This program -Facilitating Access to Infrastructure Resilience in Area C and East Jerusalem program (FAIR) is funded by the Italians, and managed by UNDP. Italy wanted a project with full visibility of the PM's office; the Ministry of Local Government is the main government counterpart[67]. There are, however, some hopes that the Norwegians will support the program and perhaps also the Finnish. SIDA continues to feel that "CRDP can have an important role to play and give the 150,000 Palestinians who live in Area C and those in EJ a sense of belonging… and let them know that PA is also caring for them and not only for people of Areas A/B. "[68]

4.4.4 Grant size and coverage

There is a unanimous consensus among implementing partners that the size of the project budgets is too small to make much of an impact on the communities targeted. While there is some logic to the CRDP position that as a pilot project, it is important to carefully test approaches with the limited amounts of funds available, project visits conducted by the evaluation team indicated that the projects were unable to provide blanket coverage to even the small communities targeted. As a result, up to 50% of the households targeted in some communities visited were excluded from project benefits. Interviews with implementing partners and their close out reports also made the same point.[69] This should be a concern for CRDP as creating additional differences within the communities targeted in terms of access to assets can only further degrade the community cohesion essential to developing greater resilience.

4.4.5 Financial management

Financial management procedures seem unnecessarily heavy and do not always correspond to actual implementation requirements, which, particularly in Area C, are subject to change. Changes to scheduled plans and activities in the field can create delays in payments as activities need to be reconfigured to cope with external factors. The two phase system also prevents effective and efficient planning as there is no legal(?)agreement in place for the second phase, which may place contractors themselves in an uncertain situation and implementing partners in situations of potentially significant financial risk. Implementing partners mentioned the need to pay contractors

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[66] Meeting with the PMU team.
[67] The description of the program is almost identical to the CRDP's: The FAIR has a "specific focus on vital sectors such as health, education, housing, cultural heritage, energy, transportation, water and wastewater. Activities in both East Jerusalem and Area C will be identified through community needs assessments carried out by UNDP in close coordination with the Palestinian Government". UNDP Press Release of November 14, 2014: http://arabstates.undp.org/content/rbas/en/home/presscenter/pressreleases/2013/11/14/
[68] Interview with Peter Lundberg, former head of development cooperation for Sida in Jerusalem.
[69]Danchurchaid,

– who take significant risks themselves in working in Area C - in a timely fashion. When UNDP closes its books at year end, CRDP partner cannot process requests for payment for up to 6 weeks, which seems unreasonable for projects which are relatively short term (8- 12 months).

All EJ projects which procure goods in EJ have to absorb the cost of the VAT themselves, unless they include the cost in their project budget. This is because SIDA's agreement is with the PA and although SIDA funds are tax exempt, this does not apply in areas annexed by Israel and which form of the Israeli fiscal system. As a result, EJ project partners who support the EJ market and business as an overall part of their project support, are either forced to purchase from the West Bank or bear additional costs themselves.

4.5   Recommendations

4.5.1   The SB should activate a fundraising strategy which targets the donor community in general and specific donors in particular who have already expressed a clear interest in being part of the CRDP mechanism. Presentations of results to date within a convened donor forum – similar to that used to launch the needs assessment in July 2013 – could be one part of such a strategy, together with additional lobbying in donor meetings of the kind conducted by Sweden with EU partners during project formulation.

4.5.2   Budget allocations across the various program functions seem reasonable, but an urgent response is required from UNDP to the knowledge/experience gaps already identified by the PMU in the areas of technical support (legal, infrastructure), UNDP procedures, contracting modalities, civil society competencies, which UNDP is well placed to manage. UNDP should also employ the resources of their focal points to provide gender training for PMU staff and conduct targeted quality assurance audits on the CRDP project portfolio to support the identification of lessons learned for future programing.

4.5.3   As grant funds are now very limited CRDP should add a criteria to its next CFPs and to the proposal evaluation matrix which mandates partners to ensure that their beneficiary coverage is inclusive in any one community for projects which create private goods (e.g. solar packages, housing) and/or target the poorest households within these communities with criteria which are transparent and acceptable to the community.

4.5.4   **The CRDP mechanism cannot continue to be viewed as business-as-usual by UNDP management. The bureaucratic procedures, behaviours and practices which can serve traditional development programs well, are a significant disservice to the CRDP mechanism envisaged, which requires much greater flexibility and nimbleness in its approach.** The current system of phasing for projects above $150,000 should cease; thresholds for reimbursements should be set at a reasonable level and be effected as and when partners request; to ensure fiscal accountability, CRDP unit should conduct 'spot-checks' on randomly selected partners and provide financial management support to weaker partners.

4.5.5.An update of the OM may be required to delineate the changes that have been made in the contracting process to date so that it can serve as a living document based on the experience of the flexibility required to implement a mechanism like CRDP, where micro-management is an impairment to project results.

<u>**Section 5 - Gender Considerations**</u>

5.1   <u>UNDP's and PA's gender policy</u>

5.1.1 PA's Cross-Sectoral National Gender Strategy: Promoting Gender Equality and Equity 2011-2013

Gender equality is gaining ground within the Palestinian society, thanks to the involvement of women in the Palestinian struggle and in spite of cultural, political, and social obstacles. The PA has progressively addressed the issue since 1994. As a result of an assessment undertaken in 2009, twenty-four gender units were created in various ministries and governmental institutions, moreover, the council of ministers issued a decision in 2009 for ministries to adopt a gender sensitive budget. However, the gap is still present between the government's will and implementation. Thus, gender units in ministries are facing several problems such as the lack of will and commitment of individual ministries, inadequate budget allocation, and exclusion of gender staff from planning and budgeting, and more importantly, insufficient gender sensitivity or targeting in programs on the ground.

On March 2010 the plan of the Cross Sectoral National Gender Strategy (CSNGS) was sent to the council of ministers for approval. The CSNGS was formed as a result of an institutional gender analysis of ministries and it seeks to provide guiding principles to include gender issues in the work of all ministries. Thus the 9th strategic objective in the strategy is to mainstream gender concerns and issues in the work of Palestinian governmental ministries.

he CSNGS is a part of the national strategy of the Palestinian Authorities, as it reflects the PA commitment to equality, equity, and involvement in combating all types of discrimination. Other than advocating gender equality and equity, the strategy gives guidance for reducing gender gaps. The gender issue is considered a cross sectoral issue because all ministries and governmental institutions have an important role in gender mainstreaming and in decreasing the gender gap across all sectors. All ministries were therefore involved in the development of the CSNGS.

5.1.2 UNDP Gender Equality Strategy 2014-2017: "The Future We Want: Rights and Empowerment"

The UNDP Gender Equality Strategy 2014-2017 is considered the second UNDP gender equality strategy since 2005. It promotes gender equality and women empowerment because they are considered central to the mandate of the UNDP and basic for UNDP's development approach. The mission of the gender strategy is consistent with the UNDP strategic plan, it aims to decrease poverty and make significant reductions in gender inequalities to make the world a more inclusive, sustainable, and resilient place for women. The strategy focuses on women and girls facing multiple and intersecting forms of discrimination.

The UNDP's gender strategy focuses on the need of integrating gender equality in their three main strategic pillars in the OPTs: sustainable development pathways, inclusive and effective democratic governance, and resilience building. The strategy includes coordination and partnerships as vital implementation tools, including with UNWomen and other UN entities, civil society, and other important partners. It is important to note that UNDP will partner and support civil society in the implementation of this strategy at global, national, and regional levels. They will also involve CSOs

at policy making and decision making with special focus on women and excluded groups' engagement. Finally, UNDP proposes to mainstream gender in all its activities.

5.2   Integration of Gender in the CRDP

5.2.1 Gender in the CRDP Portfolio:[70] Projects which are specifically addressing gender and those which have a gender component

Four (13%) out of the 30 CRDP projects reviewed have women's empowerment as their sole focus addressing women's leadership, building their technical and business skills, and preparing them employment and economic empowerment with total budgets of US$311,087.

In addition, there are 10 other projects that address gender issues as part of their project design and target women within their desired outcomes. For example the main objective of the Dan Church Aid's project was to empower vulnerable households in marginalized areas and improve their living conditions. They have targeted women to achieve their overall goal but their main target group was not women. From these nine projects, eight have clear gender specific components in their budgets which total 52% (US$ 498,750) of their combined budget totals.

> **Gender relations in Area C**
> The impact that Israeli policies in Area C have on gender relations and the family fabric is striking. In the PHG project providing water cisterns for farmers and herders in the community of Tel El Kashaba on the Eastern slopes of Nablus governorate, because of the persistent and almost continuous demolition of family housing structures in the area, men have had to send the women and young children to nearby Aqaba town, only men and boys stay on the land and the men send the milk is sent to Aqaba for processing by the women. This implies again the need for an integrated and gender-wise cross sectoral approach to the development needs of these communities.

Other projects do not have gender, women, and youth specified in their objectives or results frameworks, but in fact, they have a significant gender dimension (see below). Fourteen (47.3%), or less than half the projects which formed part of this review had gender indicators as part of their log frames and reporting frameworks and only fewer projects provided consistently gender disaggregated results data. Although gender analysis is included in problem statements, this is rarely carried through to project design elements. When the design does include gender elements – there are no indicators to assess their impact on project products or participants. For example, Al Maqdasee includes a training program to ensure the mainstreaming of gender into all municipal policies and practice, but does not include an indicator that assesses the impact of this on publications produced or on the perceptions of participants themselves. Although an assessment of the participation rates of and the anticipated impact of the project on women and youth is required, the evaluation criteria presented in the Evaluation Grid in the OM does not include an assessment of gender mainstreaming in the projects, Sweden in particular has expressed a level of dissatisfaction with this aspect of project appraisal.

5. 3 Evaluation Questions

Four evaluation questions are addressed below:

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[70] This analysis is based on a review of 30 projects for which documentation was available in the form of either the full proposal, log frame and budget or the log frame and budget only.

(i)   Are the projects selected and their designs responsive to the PA and the UNDP gender policies, in particular to the reduction in promoting gender equality, reducing gender gaps, and fostering the resilience and sustainable socio-economic empowering of women?

(ii)   Are the completed projects generating the expected gender impact?

(iii)   Is the monitoring of gender results adequate to report on gender mainstreaming?

(iv)   What are the lessons learned to ensure the expected gender results?

5.4   Evaluation Analysis

5.4.1   Project selection and design

Although the call for proposals does not specify that proponents have to be knowledgeable about the PA and/or UNDP gender policy, the template for applicants requires that: (a) the potential number of project beneficiaries be disaggregated by gender (men, women, boys and girls), and (b) it be indicated "in which way this project is gender sensitive and how it will impact gender relationships"[71]. Points are attributed to "an analysis of youth and women" in the assessment of proposals, but it is not clear whether the gender focus of projects was highlighted by the Review Board.

Overall, the percentage of projects (47%), which have a gender focus or a gender component in their stated objectives and designs, is somewhat low if this figure is against UNDP's gender mainstreaming policy. However, this quantitative assessment is somewhat misleading when compared to projects non-quantitative results (see below).

5.4.2   Project Results[72]

Project completion reports are somewhat informative as to gender results and impact, mostly the quantitative indicators such as, number of women reporting increased economic opportunities (Al Shmoh), number of women completing training courses(COOPI). The projects contribute positively to addressing issues which, if sustained, assist in closing the gender gap – whether through education, economic empowerment, or rights, altogether the projects are too small and fragmented to be able to generate a significant impact in closing the gender gap. The team's field visits as well as the focus groups did reveal, however, that most implementers are quite gender-sensitive and very proud of their achievements for the benefit of women. For example, the

> "It is wonderful to see our children learning English from watching TV and using computers which is indispensable to finding work outside the community."
> *Bedouin family from Ras Ein Al Auja, Jericho*

projects providing solar home systems to Bedouin families ease the work burden on women of milk-churning tasks: once solar electricity becomes available, families can use an electric churner and store their milk products and food. Those projects also provide women with the opportunity of some leisure (watching TV for fun or to feel connected to the world). Projects where women and youth acquire new skills [YWCA –Photography class for young women in EJ] give them a sense of worth and hope that they can have a fulfilling professional life.

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[71] CRDP Proposal Template Section 9: Gender Approach

[72]The analysis in this section is based on the nine project visits accomplished, a review of CRDP's own M&E records, and progress and close out project reports which were received for 16 projects.

Although it is not possible to provide an adequate evaluation of the impact of the projects on gender equality (the objective of the PA gender policy), or on gender relations (the question asked in the UNDP call for proposals)[73], the field visits also revealed that in the communities where the benefits were equally shared by women and men, there was a shared sense of improved welfare, economic empowerment, identity, and being able to build up a future for their children. Interestingly enough, contrary to what is usually assumed, women – at least in the Bedouin communities visited -- were more satisfied by the fact that their physical burden was alleviated and that they had some leisure than by the fact that they did not necessarily control the monetary income from the sale of their milk products. In farming and herding communities in Area C, it was clear that access to water Projects which help to increase access to water help to address the latter issue.

5.4.3 Monitoring gender results: Is the monitoring of gender results adequate to report on gender mainstreaming?

As noted above, the use of gender indicators and gender disaggregated results reporting is a not strongly integrated into log frames and reporting, although gender disaggregated data are mandated for project proposals Although gender analysis is included in problem statements, the gender issue is often not addressed in the project design or indicators. As a result it is not always apparent to what extent men and women are provided with equal opportunities to participate in project activities, what factors affect the different levels of participation of men and women, and how women and men are differently impacted by the project results as required as part of the project appraisal process. At the project level, based on quantitative data provided, gender mainstreaming would seem weak. However, qualitative data provided in implementation reporting, as well as interviews with beneficiaries during field visits indicates that gender perspectives and attention to the goal of gender equality are more central to the design of project activities that the quantitative data suggest. For example, in the CADL project to improve livelihood of Bedouin families in Area C through the provision of solar packages, while there were no gender indicators included in the log frame, it was clear in interviews with both the women and the men in the community of Ras Ein Al Auja that women had been the prime beneficiaries of the project, dramatically changing their lives but opening up space for the pursuit of more social and educational activities.

5.4.4 Lessons learned. What are the lessons learned to ensure the expected gender results?

When men and women have equal opportunities to benefit from project activities and resources, development outcomes become more sustainable. For example, male participants in the EJ focus group opined that men should be more involved in CRDP projects for children's educational and special needs. While some implementation approaches actively focused on involving women s in community planning and implementation activities, reporting and M&E records show that this is not always a strong consideration. This requires a shift in expectations and performance that has to be consciously planned for. Measuring movement towards gender equality and understanding under what conditions this takes place will ensure that future project designs can enable more sustainable use of resources and assets.

5.5   Recommendations

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[73]See Chapter II Section 1.3 on Methodology.

- CRDP should continue to require gender disaggregated beneficiary data in project designs, but should also mandate the inclusion of gender indicators within the project-level log frames so that the differential impact on gender relations within households, changes in status, roles and participation can be captured in the process of building resilience in the households and the wider community.
- CRDP must insist on consistent gender disaggregated data in reporting so that a complete picture is built of the quantitative impact of projects.
- In order to better reflect and learn from the qualitative and quantitative impact of gender on building resilience, CRDP should add a gender section to the reporting format where qualitative and quantitative impact is demonstrated and given life.

Section 6 - Knowledge Generation.

Learning from implementation experience was one of the CRDP's main objectives, so that SIDA and other donors could assess the value-added of the approach. However, other than with the mid-term and end-of-project evaluation, there was no specific provision to facilitate the knowledge generation process/learning from CRDP. As noted in Section 2 (implementation modalities), the approach to data analysis and dissemination must be strategic enough to allow for a full appreciation of how results – including beneficiary behaviours – and risk mitigation measures are contributing to the achievement of program goals and objectives and enable an assessment of the replicability of the approach in the pursuit of increased community resilience.

6.1 Evaluation questions

- What knowledge was generated by the CRDP as to the feasibility of implementing development activities (as opposed to humanitarian) in Area C and EJ?
- Based on this knowledge, is the approach replicable?
- What mechanisms were used to facilitate knowledge generation and sharing?

6.2 Evaluation analysis

It is clear that the concept of 'development' in Area C and EJ without a political solution of the two-state solution is not fully 'applicable'. A lot of knowledge is available as to how to potentially help the communities harassed by Israel, and the need to provide them with strong legal support. More could have been achieved with a better design of proposals (see Section 1 of this chapter), investment in capacity building, and the inclusion of a risk-management mechanism. It does not seem that CRDP PMU tried to capitalize from the knowledge of other programs, e.g. the World Bank community project.

Project reporting by partners is thorough, but the fact that several of the projects try to keep a low profile vis-à-vis the Israelis to protect both implementation and to mitigate future risks to the communities targets, prevents knowledge sharing through the use of traditional and social media.

Within the CRDP PMU, knowledge sharing seems a little ad hoc, somewhat informal and not systematic. As Section 2 has highlighted, CRDP M&E processes in place do not enable a program-level analysis of implementation experience based on recommendations from which the PMU and implementing partners can learn in order to improve their performance in reaching the envisaged

program-level results. PMU staff members have recognized the need to address this issue and are taking steps to revise the tools and process for more strategic analysis of data. Significant levels of project documentation do exist but require a more outcomes –based approach to the information it contains. An emerging understanding of beneficiary behaviours around infrastructure, livelihood, natural resource and social capital investments, for example is a critical component of future sustainability but is not well documented or synthesized. An analysis of how and why project interventions have contributed to resilience, and if and how projects have created synergistic and multiplier effects is not being assessed for future project design methodologies. Finally, there is no program-level analysis of risk management documentation, which would enable trends to be identified to inform future risk management strategies.

Although M&E methodologies and activities are generating significant data, there is no systematic system in place which provides a sufficient level of analysis to generate and share knowledge which can test the validity of the program approach, inform program decision-making, or enable an assessment as to the replicability of the CRDP approach. Despite requests from Sweden and **contrary to many experiences with decentralized (not to say fragmented) programs, CRDP has not yet developed a website which could have facilitated knowledge exchange between implementers, and between the various geographic areas.**

6.3   Recommendations

- Knowledge management serves as a critical support and resource for all CRDP outputs and should be added as another pillar/theme within the outputs (see Section 1 – Program Objectives and Outputs). All partners should include a knowledge generation component within their proposals to show how they will identify the implementation lessons (including around sustainability, risk mitigation, and beneficiary behaviours) and bring these together in a unified manner in their reporting.
- Free up PMU resources from reporting to enable a focus on a modification of the M&E systems, tools and technology in place which would most flexibly and appropriately enable partners to generate useful data on emerging outcomes.
- Generate lessons identified through implementation to-date from implementing partners through a dedicated workshop (with donor attendance) where CRDP presents a synthesis of lessons learned to date for open discussion, review and validation. These lessons learned could be used as a resource to modify application requirements of future calls for proposals, and evaluation criteria as necessary.
- Establish a website which could be and/or linked this to implementers Facebook pages for knowledge sharing so that emerging lessons can be captured and used by implementing partners to improve on-going and future implementation. Ensure that lessons identified are regularly synthesized and disseminated to partners for validation and feedback and to donors and management for decision-making purposes.

Section 7 - Sustainability

Sustainability was addressed in the PD at the project level but not at the program level. The sustainability of projects was to be assessed against technical, economic, policy, and social parameters.

7.1 Evaluation questions

- Was sustainability adequately addressed at the project level in the PD to assume that the sum of the projects would make the program sustainable?
- Were the project guidelines to implementers clear as to how project implementers should plan for the sustainability of the proposed project interventions?
- Is the sustainability of the program possible without the completion of negotiations of the two-state solution?

Sustainability parameters in the CRDP PD

- <u>Technical parameters:</u> The action will improve the technical skills and competencies for technical staff and the groups of beneficiaries (farmers for example) targeted by it activities, staff from the MOPAD, the local NGOs (included women organizations) involved will further develop capacities in support to communities in area c
- <u>Economic parameters:</u> The design from the beginning of the intervention according to a business oriented approach (for example, election of proper varieties, proper design of land reclamation scheme, water availability and enhancement of technical / professional skills among selected beneficiaries) will facilitate the long term sustainability of the selected intervention. The action will have an impact on the economic sustainability and financial resilience of communities in area C. Local NGOs will be deeply involved in the action and will have good job opportunities and great opportunity to enhance their capacity.
- <u>Policy level:</u> Through the MOPAD and the PMU all actors involved in the project, farmers, village councils line ministries and Local NGOs will be empowered to participate in the discussions and elaborations which define policies and strategies related to the Area C. In addition, such structures and the PMU can play a significant role to direct and coordinate other programs and donors as well as influencing decisions at National level.
- <u>Social level:</u> At the social level, the action will lead to an improvement of the community and stakeholder participatory mechanisms. The representative structures will be accountable for the development of the single and collective actions. Stimulating the participation and the relationships within and among the rural communities involved, the action will also reduce the risk of internal conflicts

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7.2 Evaluation analysis

The Evaluation has the following observations:

7.2.1 The selection of the four parameters of sustainability at the project level is fairly standard, the actual description of parameters in the PD is somewhat confusing if read without examples or without a lot of experience with the manipulation of logical frameworks. For example, the question of skills is covered in both the technical and economic categories, but not in the social category. This depends on the type of project. Ownership, financial and institutional parameters – particularly critical for development work in Area C and EJ because of high levels of donor dependency and lack of institutional linkages - were not included or defined within the parameters.

7.2.2 The CRDP program was designed to make the transition from a humanitarian to development approach with, as the Swedes explained, funding part humanitarian and part development with the ratios evolving over time to privilege development activities. This implies that the issue of sustainability becomes more important as the program implementation progresses. This is not reflected in the CFP documents, where

sustainability, although included in the first and second round CFP documents as a factor in evaluation for proposals, is absent in the third round documents. .

7.2.3   The guidelines provided to implementing partners in the CFPs were not linked to the articulation of the parameters of sustainability presented in the PD and were extremely general –"indicate how this initiative will be sustained after the approved funds end and how you plan to exit the project". As a result, the sustainability strategies proposed were equally broad and general, lacking in definition and as result very difficult to assess. In the proposals reviewed,   sustainability was linked primarily to the development of human capital of the direct beneficiaries in the form of technical and professional skills(39%); increase in fee-paying base and future fundraising (17%); creating local ownership (11%); institutionalization of the output   (schools, teaching methodologies)within existing structures at the policy or operational levels (17%); replicable model created (5.5%); multiplier effects (5.5%); or nothing at all (5.5%).

7.2.4   Interviews with implementing partners and beneficiaries in the field show that the lack of definition and understanding of strategies for sustainability within projects in the Area C and EJ context can re-enforce the very passive behaviours and expectations of these communities who have been recurrent recipients of humanitarian aid.

7.2.5   Obstacles to sustainability:

- Lack of Palestinian institutions to defend the rights of the Palestinian communities in Area C and East Jerusalem. The field visits revealed that there are communities left without any political or administrative representation at all. When issues arise with the Israeli occupation they are left to fend for themselves. Implementers have acted as intermediaries to help such communities find legal resources to represent them in the Israeli court.

- Ownership   and   donor dependency: As a consequence of successive rounds of humanitarian assistance, communities in Area C exhibit a high level of donor dependency in their behaviours. Implementing   partners   noted, particularly   among   Bedouin communities, that there is great passivity rather than self-reliance, and communities now expect that external assistance will continue to address their development needs without any effort on their part. The proliferation of donor plaques on completed projects that the evaluation team saw on their field visits speaks to this. Field visits demonstrated that project designs sometimes missed possible opportunities to confer greater sustainability to outputs by creating a private rather than a public good.(see Section 1). Other projects (Shmoh Tourism Center) have developed a business model for the management of the center based on its own members rather

> **External assistance and the issue of ownership**
> One implementing partner explained that they had tried to obtain cash contributions from households targeted for solar packages to introduce some sense of ownership and responsibility. It proved so difficult, that the local implementing partner agreed to try to raise funds outside the project to finance the difference. A community-based energy facility may have created an opportunity to create a dynamic of community ownership and accountability which may confer greater project sustainability.

than sub-contracting income generating activities - like the café - out to the private sector, who would have a vested interest in keeping it profitable.

Even if these kinds of issues can be dealt with at the project level, the issue of sustainability for the CRDP at the program level has to be addressed in the current political context of Area C and EJ. Although actual incidents involving illegal confiscations and destructions of project investments have been statistically few, they have occurred in those projects which have most directly confronted the Israeli policy of settlement and annexation of Area C, which with increasing rapidity is compromising the possibility of the two state solution. This implies that it may be difficult to reach CRDPs program goals and objectives without a successful conclusion to final settlement negotiations. However, the challenge is legitimate developmentally, and morally inescapable.

7.3   Recommendations

- CRDP should add sustainability to the evaluation criteria for projects and provide guidance for implementing partners on the factors to be addressed in proposal design.
- At the program level, CRDP should consolidate and analyze information on the factors which obstruct and promote sustainability based on project reports and discussions with implementing partners. This knowledge can inform the guidance provided to implementing partners in the CFPs.

Chapter V: Moving forward: Challenges and Evaluation recommendations

This chapter presents the Evaluation's conclusions, challenges moving forward and recommendations.

5.1 Conclusions

Two-years into the implementation of the CRDP, five main conclusions can be drawn from the Evaluation analysis.

5.1.1   The CRDP is a good program, timely, with ambitious goals and objectives.

If, in 2009, Sweden had not started to re-examine how herself, the PA and the donors were dealing with Area C and EJ, the status quo of providing humanitarian assistance to Palestinians in these areas while Israel steadily implements its annexation policy would have continued. Five years later, there is at least significant by the PA and the donors to the significance of Area C and East Jerusalem, both for human rights reasons and for the two-state solution. In terms of human rights, the end result for Palestinians of Israel's annexation tactics are not very different from what happened to the American Indians and other indigenous peoples, whose territory has been 'conquered' by immigrants and who are left with a fraction of their assets and have to 'assimilate' in order to survive. For the two-state solution, the case is now well-documented (World Bank, 2013 and other reports) that Area C and East Jerusalem are vital for the economy of the two-state solution.

5.1.2   A relatively small CRDP will not by itself be sufficient to save Area C from annexation and East Jerusalem from further loss of Palestinian identity and coherence within the East Jerusalem Governorate.

US$16.8 million is a good start, but it only represents $56/person (assuming 300,000 potential beneficiaries) for much larger needs, especially if there is a serious objective to lay the foundations for sustainable development, economic growth, and improved living conditions. There are other similar programs, so one could consider that the sum of all these programs may be adequate to meet the development needs. The drawback of separate versus one large program, especially when they are all led by different PA and implementation institutions is the lack of synergy between programs, the lesser capacity building, and the absence of a unified coherent approach on risk management vis-à-vis the Israeli occupation.

5.1.3   In its early stages, the CRDP is making a positive direct humanitarian contribution to immediate beneficiaries (individuals and communities), but its contribution to the resilience and sustainable development of Palestinians in Area C and East Jerusalem was still marginal, but expected to expand with time.

The interventions at the project level undoubtedly benefit the immediate beneficiaries of the projects – children who benefit from improved education, teachers whose skills are enhanced, women whose work burden is alleviated through technology acquisition, herders and farmers who gain access to water, and all the women and men whose income improves, at least temporarily, from work on construction or from gaining access to land or businesses. These benefits, combined to the gains in identity, community strength, and knowledge in accessing legal services all contribute towards building the resilience of the small number of families and communities who benefit from the program.. However, the program is fragmented into a scatter of initiatives, and the present scale of the program is too small to have a significant impact on all the collective resilience of Palestinians living in Area C and East Jerusalem. Furthermore, the potential sustainability of the benefits and gains has yet to be established as the <u>foundations for sustainable development[74] have barely been addressed</u>: the institutions needed for sustainable development are not in place (be they businesses instead of NGOs to provide economic services, competent administrative services to support and or protect the rights of the population, access to natural resources and markets to sustain economic activities, freedom of movement of people and goods, access to quality social services without fear, threats or outrageously high costs). This is a design issue which can be corrected if the CRDP is to be continued and expanded.

5.1.4   The CRDP management framework and its operational modalities lack flexibility both to respond quickly to the needs of the projects on the ground and to address the fundamental issue of Area C and EJ development.

The phrase "time is of the essence" is particularly relevant to the situation of Area C and East Jerusalem lest the successful completion of all the implementation contracts is jeopardized as well the survival of Area C and EJ as an integral part of Palestine under the two-state solution.

At the operational level, the PMU does not seem to have the mandate to take initiative without referring to the UNDP machinery, both in terms of procedures and risk management. The PA does not have jurisdiction to intervene in case of 'crisis', and the UNDP does not include political matters in its mandate. As a result, the operational modalities are heavy on controls and have imposed a bureaucratic burden that takes time away from activities on the ground. In case of crisis,

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[74] Some beneficiaries are already expressing concern about what will happen when the project end.

implementers and the population "manage on their own" the best they can. Faced with apparent immobility of the PA and the UNDP, the Israeli continue with their harassment practices. This is inefficient and saps any chance of turning around the process from humanitarian to development aid.

5.1.5 The CRDP implementation to date is rich of lessons but the program lacks a knowledge management process to capitalize on these lessons.

Learning from implementation experience was one of CRDP's main objectives so that donors could assess the value-added of the approach. Knowledge must be generated at the program-level across the areas of beneficiary behaviours, risk management and sustainability to enable a strategic vision of how and results are contributing to the achievement of program goals and objectives and how this informs the replicability of the program approach in the pursuit of increased community resilience across thematic and geographical areas. Although M&E methodologies and tools are generating significant data, there is no system in place which can provide a level of analysis to create the knowledge necessary to test the validity of the program approach and inform program-level decision making. Adding knowledge management as a new output theme will help to ensure essential focus in this area, without which the lessons identified across all areas will be lost in project-level reporting requirements and be unable to serve as an essential resource for effective program development.

5.2 <u>Challenges moving forward</u>

How to create a critical mass of interventions in order to generate substantial results, for example, on infrastructure services, on agricultural production, on education, on identity, on community cohesion etc., which will a) translate into people and institutions being more resilient in the face of threats to their livelihoods and to their existence as Palestinians; and b) ensure the sustainability of the interventions and strengthen the foundations for the two-state solution?

Against this fundamental challenge, there are two main operational challenges:

- How to maximize the outcomes from the program during the remaining year of implementation
- How to capitalize on this first phase of the program, whether it should be continued and under what conditions.

5.2.1 Maximizing outcomes during the remaining year of CRDP implementation.

Several options can be considered.

<u>5.2.1.1 Option 1: Complete the projects contracted, launch a last call for proposals, but make some improvements to the operational modalities.</u>

The Evaluation believes that it is important for the PA/UNDP/donors to honor their contractual arrangements with implementers for the projects still under implementation, and for the projects recently contracted after the third call for proposals. A last call for proposals for the remainder of the funds $4.6 million could be launched as soon as possible. For rounds 3 and 4 projects, in particular, six significant improvements could be made in the operational modalities:

- Request the partner to explain the measures that will be included in the project to ensure the sustainability of the project once the CRDP funding is completed;
- Request that each project set funds aside for legal assistance to manage urgent risks. If unused, the necessary adjustment will be made in the final disbursement.
- Reduce the disbursement tranches: either 'pay as you go' up to 80% of the contract, and pay the remaining 20% upon satisfactory completion;
- Reduce the bureaucratic requirements to: one work plan at the beginning of the project (which should be attached to the contract), and two reports: one mid-term implementation report, and one completion report.
- Clarify the risk management responsibilities of the PMU, UNDP, PA, Donors so that partners are not left on their own to find solutions.
- Organize two knowledge sharing workshops during the period, one as soon as possible so that round 3 projects partners can learn from rounds 1 and 2 partners.

5.2.1.2 Option 2. Complete existing projects but change the content of the last call for proposals.

The objective would be to increase the synergy between outputs in a given geographical area, in order to create a critical mass of results. The last call for proposals could be limited to a selected pool of prequalified implementers, and targeted at limited geographical and thematic areas complementary to those covered in the first three rounds. For example, a community which benefitted from infrastructure (output 1) but not from support on livelihoods (output 3), could be targeted for output 3 under the fourth call. Alternatively, where only a fraction of the number of families in a given community has been reached under round 1-3, the same type of intervention could be extended in order to cover 100% of the families. For the selection of projects and partners' interventions, specific attention should be paid to equity amongst beneficiaries within one community and across communities benefiting from the program[75].

5.2.1.3 Option 3.Use the remaining funds to pilot a new approach for the program.

Although the current phase of the program is de facto a pilot phase, now that lessons are available on the initial program design and implementation, a new approach could be pilot with remaining funds US$ 3.7million. This pilot could consist of the following:

- Select two geographical areas in two governorates to be served by the CRDP.
- Select two control areas in each governorate which will not be served by the CRDP (or by any similar donor-funded program).
- In each selected area, select the communities to be served, and identify control (unserved) communities.
- For each community, the full package of five outputs recommended (infrastructure, human development services, natural resources assets, livelihoods/employment and business creation, capacity building).

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[75] For example, Bedouins in Hebron benefitting from DanChurchAid receive an SHS package with appliances, which is probably at least 20-30% more expensive that the Bedouins receiving SHS without appliances in Jericho. In Jericho, the poorer families were left behind as they could not afford the initial fee to join the cooperative. As a result, inequalities within the community increased visibly.

- The implementation partners could be selected competitively, through the formation of <u>consortia</u>, including NGOs of all kinds, private sector firms, LGUs and other government services).
- The project would be designed on the basis of a solid baseline survey, and activities would be selected with a view to maximize resilience and sustainability criteria.
- The completion results of the pilot should be evaluated through qualitative and quantitative surveys in both the served and control communities in order to assess whether the comprehensive approach gives significant results on the potential resilience and sustainability in Area C and East Jerusalem.

The pilot could also include the testing of new implementation arrangements between the PMU, UNDP, and the Review Board/Steering Committee, in order to achieve three objectives: flexibility and responsiveness to field implementation needs, accountability for results at all levels, and effective risk management.

5.2.1.4 Possible extension of the current phase of the CRDP

The CRDP is supposed to be completed by the end of August 2015. This is a very short period to complete the existing period and commit/use the balance of funds meaningfully, especially, if the steering committee decides to pilot the comprehensive approach.

5.2.1.5 Continuation of the CRDP

There are enough good elements and results in the CRDP to already start considering developing it into a full-fledged program for Area C and East Jerusalem, for at least five years. It is assumed that the same goals and objectives would be kept and would support the two-state solution. The program would continue to be a high-risk program but could be strengthened along the following lines:

(i)   Select interventions more strategically, i.e., in geographical areas particularly prone to annexation. This would imply intensifying the work on the five outputs described in the pilot, which are the pillars or building up resilience and sustainable development.

(ii)   Set up a risk management and response system that is recognized as a joint tool of the PA and the international community, anchored on the respect of international laws and the Oslo Accords. The aim would be to legitimize the work in those areas as development work instead of humanitarian work.

(iii)   Increase the accountability of the PA for Area C and EJ, by making the relevant PA institution the lead agency for the program and be accountable for donor mobilization for the program.

(iv)   Streamline the institutional structure, with an effective Program Board chaired by the PA; a strengthened PMU so that it both report directly to the PA lead institution and be accountable for development results; and a Technical Review Committee to advise the PMU. If proved feasible and effective, field implementation could be done through public/private consortia as described for the pilot.

(v)   Increase donor support to the program within this unified institutional framework. All donors (including multilaterals like the World Bank and UN agencies) should see the merits of pooling their resources and efforts as a tool for effectively achieving the two-state solution.

5.3 <u>Recommendations</u>

The Evaluation's main recommendations are presented below; other recommendations have been listed in relevant sections of the report.

1. Complete the implementation of the current phase of the CRDP, combining options 1 and 3 presented above, i.e., complete the rounds 2-3 contracted projects with the proposed improvements, and option 3: use the balance of funds to pilot a new comprehensive approach with a design focused on resilience and sustainability criteria.

2. Organize a major meeting (or series of meetings as appropriate) with the PA (including representatives from governorates), donors and implementers, to share the knowledge acquired from the CRDP, and establish the commitment to a stronger and expanded CRDP program as a major tool to give a chance to the two-state solution.

ANNEX ONE

List of people met: interviewees, focus groups, field visits (in alphabetical order)

Interviewees

Anas Abdeen	Administrative Manager, Al Maqdese for Society Development
Dr Andrea Nasi	Representative, Austrian Development Agency
Eng Abdullah Q Lahlouh	Deputy Minister, Ministry of Agriculture
Axel Wernhoff	Ambassador of Sweden to Norway, former Consul General of Sweden in Jerusalem
Amani Al Alem	Coordinator, Al Murtaqa
Dana Erekat	Special Advisor to the Minister, Head of Aid Management and Coordination Directorate, Ministry of Planning and Administrative Development
Hadeel Sous	Public Relations Assistant, Al Maqdese for Society Development
Dr Inad Surkhi	General Manager, Department of Planning and Development, In charge of Jerusalem Affairs File
Dr Johan Schaar	Consul, Head of Development Cooperation, Consulate General of Sweden
Lina Abdallah	Project Leader, VNDP Program, World Bank
Maher Daoudi	Program Manager, SIDA
Nader Atta	Program Manager, UNDP
Riham Kharroub	Program Manager, Austrian Development Agency
Sufian Mushasha	Senior Advisor, Head of Research and Advisory Team, UNDP
Shereen Aweidah	Director, Al Murtaqa

Focus Groups

East Jerusalem Implementing Partners:

Sandrine Amer	YWCA
May Amira	YWCA
Amin Natshe	Dar Aytam School
Muath Shuqair	Burj Al Luqluq Association
Anmar Assali	Al Saraya Centre
Hiyam Eleyan	Al Saraya Centre

Rana Eleyan	Spafford Children Centre
Jantiem Dajani	Spafford Children Centre
Amer Khalil	Al Hakawati
Valeria Moro	COOPI
Ala' Makari	Jerusalem Christian Development Association
Ali Rayyan	Al Hoash Palestinian Art Court

Area C Implementing Partners:

Awad Abu Swai	Program Coordinator, ACTED
Ismail Nujoum	Director, Al Mawrid
Katia Niemi	We Effect
Munzer Zahran	Ta'awon
Dario Franchetti	Vento di Terra
Fahm Abu Sayme	ARIJ

Field Visits

Saed Al Jundi,	Deputy School Principal, Tawani
Walid _____,	Project Manager, Al Mawrid
Adli _____,	Teacher of History, Math, Arabic Literature at Tawani School
George Majaj	Program Officer, DanchurchAid, Middle East
Mohammed Karake,	Engineer, ARIJ
Aseel Baidoun,	Communications Officer, DanchurchAid
Abu Ayman,	Member of Bedouin community in Dakaika
Sara_____	Female Bedouin beneficiary in Dkaika
Mona____	Female Bedouin beneficiary in Dkaika
Firyal_____	Female Bedouin beneficiary in Dkaika
Jadei_____	Female Bedouin beneficiary in Dkaika
Sheikh Musa Jahaleen	President, Cooperative Association for Livestock Development in the Bedouin Community in Jericho and the Jordan Valley
Faida___	Female Bedouin beneficiary, Ras Ein Al Auja, Jericho
Le'a__	Female Bedouin beneficiary, Ras Ein Al Auja, Jericho
Mariam___	Female Bedouin beneficiary, Ras Ein Al Auja, Jericho
Intissar___	Female Bedouin beneficiary, Ras Ein Al Auja, Jericho

Awad Abu Swai	Project Officer, ACTED
Ahmad Abu Srour	Beneficiary farmer in Jebel Abu Zaid, Bethlehem
Omar Effendi	Beneficiary farmer in Jebel Abu Zaid, Bethlehem
Nasr Suboh	Beneficiary farmer in Jebel Abu Zaid, Bethlehem
Adel _____	Beneficiary farmer in Jebel Abu Zaid, Bethlehem
Eng Joudeh	Palestine Hydrology Group
Eng Kanaan	Palestine Hydrology Group
	3 Herders and farmers in Tel Al Khashaba
Mohamed Safie,	Member of Local Council in Beit Furik and the Land Research Center
Aisha_____	Beneficiary of YWCA multimedia training program
Fadwa_____	Beneficiary of YWCA multimedia training program
Areej_____	Beneficiary of YWCA multimedia training program
Nura_____	Beneficiary of YWCA multimedia training program
Amani_____	Beneficiary of YWCA multimedia training program
Mousa_____	Beneficiary of YWCA multimedia training program
Hani Murad	Design training consultant, Al Murtaqa
	6 female design training beneficiaries, Al Mutaqa

ANNEX TWO: EVALUATION WORKPROGRAM

Monday, September 1	Tuesday, September 2	Wednesday, September 3	Thursday, September 4	Friday, September 5	Saturday, September 6	Sunday, September 7
Kick off meeting with UNDP following contract award	Start of Desk Review and preparation of Inception Report	Desk Review Development of evaluation tools and sampling	Development of evaluation tools and sampling		Development of evaluation tools and sampling	

Monday, September 8	Tuesday, September 9	Wednesday, September 10	Thursday, September 11	Friday, September 12	Saturday, September 13	Sunday, September 14
Internal review of Inception Report	Submission of Inception Report	Desk Review	Desk Review		Desk Review	Arrival in-country of external consultant

Monday, September 15	Tuesday, September 16	Wednesday, September 17	Thursday, September 18	Friday, September 19	Saturday, September 20	Sunday, September 21
Desk Review Field visit planning	Desk Review	Initial meeting with CRDP team, Ramallah Finalize field visit and interview planning	Meeting with Dana Erikat, MOPAD, Ramallah	Meeting with UNDP, Jerusalem Meeting with Johan Schaar, Head of Development Cooperation, SIDA, Jerusalem	Desk review and write up	Meeting with Dr Inad Surkhi, MOJ, Jerusalem Meeting with Mai Tamimi, CRDP, Ramallah

Monday, September 22	Tuesday, September 23	Wednesday, September 24	Thursday, September 25	Friday, September 26	Saturday, September 27	Sunday, September 28
Field visit with ACTED to Jebel Abu Zaid in Bethlehem governorate. Approval of Inception Report from UNDP.	Field visit to Twani (Mawrid project) and Dkaika (Danchurchaid project), South Hebron. Teleconference with Maher Daoudi, SIDA.	Meeting with Muhye el Din Al Ardah, MOLG, Ramallah Meeting with Abdallah Lahlou, MOA, Ramallah. Focus group with Area C implementing partners, Ramallah.	Meeting with Lina Abdallah, World Bank, Ramallah. Focus Group with EJ implementing partners, Jerusalem. Meeting with YWCA beneficiaries, Jerusalem.	Desk review and write up.	Field visit to PHG projects on the North Eastern slopes, Nablus governorate, Tel Al Khashaba and Beit Furik. Preparation of de-briefing presentation.	CRDP de-briefing meeting, Ramallah

Monday, September 29	Tuesday, September 30	Wednesday, October 1	Thursday, October 2	Friday, October 3	Saturday, October 4	Sunday, October 5
Documentation analysis and report writing	Documentation analysis and report writing	Documentation analysis and report writing	Documentation analysis and report writing	Telephone interview with Peter Lundberg, former head of SIDA in	Documentation analysis and report writing	Documentation analysis and report writing

						Jerusalem Documentation analysis and report writing
Monday, October 6	**Tuesday, October 7**	**Wednesday, October 8**	**Thursday , October 9**	**Friday, October 10**	**Saturday, October11**	**Sunday, October 12**
Documentation analysis and report writing	Documentation analysis and report writing	Meeting with Maher Daoudi, SIDA, California	Meeting with Riham Karroub, ADA	Documentation analysis and report writing	Documentation analysis and report writing	Documentation analysis and report writing
Monday, October 13	**Tuesday, October 14**	**Wednesday, October 15**	**Thursday , October 16**	**Friday, October 17**	**Saturday, October 18**	**Sunday, October 19**
Documentation analysis and report writing	Meeting with Al Murtaqa, Jerusalem and meeting with project beneficiaries, Jerusalem. Meeting with Al Maqdese for Social Development, Jerusalem.	Documentation analysis and report writing	Documentation analysis and report writing	Documentation analysis and report writing	Documentation analysis and report writing	Documentation analysis and report writing
Monday, October 20	**Tuesday, October 21**	**Wednesday, October 22**	**Thursday , October 23**	**Friday, October 24**	**Saturday, October 25**	**Sunday, October 26**
Documentation analysis and report writing	Documentation analysis and report writing	Documentation analysis and report writing	Documentation analysis and report writing	Documentation analysis and report writing	Internal Review	
Monday, October 27	**Tuesday, October 28**	**Wednesday, October 29**	**Thursday , October 30**	**Friday, October 31**	**Saturday, November 1**	**Sunday, November 2**
Internal review	Internal review	Draft evaluation report send to UNDP				
Monday, November 3	**Tuesday, November 4**	**Wednesday, November 5**	**Thursday , November 6**	**Friday, November 7**	**Saturday, November 8**	**Sunday, November 9**
		Presentation of draft findings to CRDP stakeholders	Comments received from UNDP on draft			
Monday, November 10	**Tuesday, November 11**	**Wednesday, November 12**	**Thursday , November 13**	**Friday, November 14**	**Saturday, November 15**	**Sunday, November 16**
		Revised draft sent to UNDP			Comments received from SIDA	
Monday,	**Tuesday,**	**Wednesday,**	**Thursday ,**	**Friday,**	**Saturday,**	**Sunday,**

November 10	November 11	November 12	November 13	November 14	November 15	November 16
		Revised draft sent to UNDP			Comments received from SIDA	
Monday, November 17	**Tuesday, November 18**	**Wednesday, November 19**	**Thursday , November 20**	**Friday, November 21**	**Saturday, November 22**	**Sunday, November 23**
Monday, November 24	**Tuesday, November 25**	**Wednesday, November 26**	**Thursday , November 27**	**Friday, November 28**	**Saturday, November 29**	**Sunday, November 30**
Monday, December 1	**Tuesday, December 2**	**Wednesday, December 3**	**Thursday , December 4**	**Friday, December 5**	**Saturday, December 6**	**Sunday, December 7**
		Meeting scheduled with UNDP for finalization of report postponed				
Monday, December 8	**Tuesday, December 9**	**Wednesday, December 10**	**Thursday , December 11**	**Friday, December 12**	**Saturday, December 13**	**Sunday, December 14**
Monday, December 15	**Tuesday, December 16**	**Wednesday, December 17**	**Thursday , December 18**	**Friday, December 19**	**Saturday, December 20**	**Sunday, December 21**
Meeting with UNDP to discuss comments for finalizing report	Additional documents received from UNDP	Revision of evaluation draft	Additional documents received from UNDP	Revision of evaluation draft	Revision of evaluation draft	
Monday, December 22	**Tuesday, December 23**	**Wednesday, December 24**	**Thursday , December 25**	**Friday, December 26**	**Saturday, December 27**	**Sunday, December 28**
Revision of evaluation draft	Final clarifications received from UNDP				Revision of evaluation draft	
Monday, December 29	**Tuesday, December 30**	**Wednesday, December 31**	**Thursday , January 1**	**Friday, January 2**	**Saturday, January 3**	**Sunday, January 4**
Revision of evaluation draft	Revised final report completed	Internal review				

ANNEX THREE - Bibliography

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ANNEX FOUR: Logical Framework approach

Project Description		Objectively verifiable indicators of achievement	Sources and means of verification	Assumptions
Goal	What is the overall broader impact to which the action will contribute?	What are the key indicators related to the overall goal?	What are the sources of information for these indicators?	What are the external factors necessary to sustain objectives in the long term?
Purpose	What is the immediate development outcome at the end of the project?	Which indicators clearly show that the objective of the action has been achieved?	What are the sources of information that exist or can be collected? What are the methods required to get this information?	Which factors and conditions are necessary to achieve that objective? (external conditions)
Outputs	What are the specifically deliverable results envisaged to achieve the specific objectives?	What are the indicators to measure whether and to what extent the action achieves the expected results?	What are the sources of information for these indicators?	What external conditions must be met to obtain the expected results on schedule?
Activities	What are the key activities to be carried out and in what sequence in order to produce the expected results?	**Means:** What are the means required to implement these activities, e. g. personnel, equipment, supplies, etc.	What are the sources of information about action progress? **Costs** What are the action costs?	What pre-conditions are required before the action starts?

Source: BARRETO,L. The Logical Framework Approach (2010)

ANNEX FIVE

Questions for Donors and other stakeholders (used as appropriate for the interlocutor)

How did the CRDP come about? What was your involvement? What is the comparative advantage of CRDP over other instruments that work in Area C?
Does CRDP meet the Government's objectives for Area C and EJ?
Why did you select NGOs as implementing partners? Why UNDP as project management?
What is the niche of the program within UNDP work? What is the role of UNDP and its relation to the CRDP-PMU and other UN agencies?
How can you help to make CRDP more sustainable? What technical capacity do you have to support NGOs/CBOs?
What did you hope to achieve with the program?
How do you assess the performance of the PMU?
What lessons have you learned from the implementation?
Recommendations/advice going forward?

Focus Group guidelines for implementing partners

1. What is the comparative advantage of CRDP over other mechanisms?
   a. What is your assessment of the fragmentation of the program for achieving the program goals.?
2. What is your assessment of the risk mitigation strategies and UNDP responses?
3. Is there a need for micro credit component within the program?
4. Are the lessons learned shared?
   a. How is the CRDP experience enriching other programs?
5. What is your assessment of services rendered by the PMU – procurement, reporting, M&E etc?
6. Are the proposal evaluation criteria and processes transparent and clearly communicated?
7. Major successes and challenges
8. Recommendations for future rounds of proposals.

ANNEX SIX

Comparison between Calls for Proposals

| Issue	Round 1	Round 2	Round 3	Totals
Budget allocated	3,929,793	1,218,087	6,922,052	12,069,932
Implementing partners targeted	LNGOs, INGOs	LNGOs, INGOs	LNGOs, INGOs, CBOs, LGU's in Area C	
Funding threshold	250,000	150,000	500,000	
Project duration	12 months	12 months	8 months	
Date issued	Nov 2012	Oct 2013	May 2014	
Proposals received	162	41	102	305
Number approved	20	10	22	52
% approved	12.3%	24.3%	10.8%	
Areas targeted	All Area C and EJ	East Jerusalem	Specific areas of Area C and EJ	
Themes addressed	All themes	Education, Culture and heritage, economic sector	Specific themes per geographical area	
Evaluation criteria	CRDP alignment 50% Quality 25% Capacity 25%	CRDP alignment 50% Quality 25% Capacity 25% With additional guidance	CRDP alignment 50% Quality 25% Capacity 25% No additional guidance	

Project Portfolio Analysis

Total number of projects awarded = 49 (30 round 1&2; 19 round 3)

Total projects completed = 17, projects under implementation =32

1.Result (output) area focus by budget share and number of interventions

Major focus so far in on Result 1 by budget allocation (*improved social and public infrastructure*)

CRDP Budget allocation across result areas

result area	description	value
1	improved social and public infrastructure	5,053,944
2	improved access to and protection of natural resources	3,419,696
3	improved economic opportunities through support to livelihoods	1,420,469
4	rights upheld through legal protection, advocacy and community networking	715,723

total value by result area

A similar pattern is evidenced in the distribution of actual projects across results areas

Distribution of projects across results area by number

result area	description	number
1	improved social and public infrastructure	24
2	improved access to and protection of natural resources	12
3	improved economic opportunities through support to livelihoods	9
4	rights upheld through legal protection, advocacy and community networking	7

75

The biggest percentage of the budget (48%) and nearly half the interventions(24) support Result 1. One third of budget (31%) and nearly one quarter of interventions (12) support Result 2. The lowest share of the budget (7%) is allocated to projects supporting result area 4.

Budget share of CRDP results areas

result area		
1	improved social and public infrastructure	48%
2	improved access to and protection of natural resources	31%
3	improved economic opportunities through support to livelihoods	13%
4	rights upheld through legal protection, advocacy and community networking	7%

Although focus is on Result area 1, average project value is higher for Result area 2 (*improved access to protection of natural resources)* and Result area 3 (*improved economic opportunities through support to livelihoods*).

Average CRDP project value by result area

average value by result		
1	improved social and public infrastructure	202,158
2	improved access to and protection of natural resources	263,053
3	improved economic opportunities through support to livelihoods	258,267
4	rights upheld through legal protection, advocacy and community networking	130,131

The share of actual projects is almost equal with Area C (24)and East Jerusalem (25). However, the overall project budget share is significantly higher in Area C with 63.4% of the budget and EJ with 36.6%. Three rounds of projects have been awarded, with the second round focused on East Jerusalem.

CRDP project distribution by main geographical focus

main geographica l focus

East jerusalem — 25

Area C — 24

CRDP project budget allocations by main geographical areas

Budget allocation

Area C — 6,736,945

EJ — 3,873,787

Area C is divided further into 4 sub areas (1) Jordan Valley (2) Eastern slopes (3) Seam Zone (4) Inner Hills. Based on available data, projects are focused on the Inner Hills (south Hebron and Bethlehem Governorates), the least area of focus being the Seam Zone.

CRDP project distribution by Area C sub locations

sub location Area C

inner hills — 15

north of eastern slopes — 5.5

jordan valley — 2.5

seam zone — 1

3.Target group focus

Predominantly community, farmer and Bedouin focus with other categories (women, youth, disabled and children) a lesser focus. A number of projects have allocated budgets for gender focused activities within the project targeting women members of the community.

CRDP projects by target group

target group	count
Community wide	9
Community and poor	2
Community and women	1
Community and women and children	1
Community and professionals	1
Farmers	9
Farmers and herders	3
Farmers and women	2
Herders	1
Bedouin	5
Bedouin and women	2
Women	2
Women and Youth	2
Women and youth and children	2
Youth	3
Disabled	2
Girls	1
Boys	1
Children	1

### 4. Implementing partner focus

Partners are predominantly LGUs (61%) with INGOs (25%), village councils (10%) and CBOs (4%).

CRDP implementing partners

Implementing partner	percentage
LNGO	61%
INGO	25%
VC	10%
CBO	4%

CRDP projects by number by implementing partner

Implementing partner	
LNGO	30
INGO	12
VC	5
CBO	2

Annex 8
Proposed institutional option compared to the current arrangement

<u>**Recommended structure(report)**</u>   <u>**Current structure (PD)**</u>

Program Board
Chair: MoPAD
Members: PA Line
Ministries/Department
Director level, donors
(SIDA, ADA, UNDP, etc.)

PMU
Senior Technical
Advisor
Senior Legal Advisor

Technical Review Committee
UNDP technical experts
(donor and technical
accountability)
Technical representatives of
line Ministries
(accountability for
Palestinian standards)

Steering Board
Co-Chairs: MoPAD, UNDP
Members: Line Ministers
Donors: SIDA, ADA

Review Board
Co-Chair: MoPAD, UNDP
Members: Line Ministries
Donors: Reps of SIDA, ADA
etc

PMU